Santa Clara High Technology Law Journal
Volume 32 | Issue 2

Article 2

8-11-2016

Can Digital Speech Loosen the Gordian Knot of
Reputation Law?
Elizabeth A. Kirley

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/chtlj
Part of the Intellectual Property Law Commons, and the Science and Technology Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Elizabeth A. Kirley, Can Digital Speech Loosen the Gordian Knot of Reputation Law?, 32 Santa Clara High Tech. L.J. 171 (2016).
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/chtlj/vol32/iss2/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Santa
Clara High Technology Law Journal by an authorized editor of Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
sculawlibrarian@gmail.com.

CAN DIGITAL SPEECH LOOSEN THE GORDIAN KNOT
OF REPUTATION LAW?
Elizabeth A. Kirley†
This paper likens the current state of reputation law to a
Gordian knot, entangled in complexities and calling for novel
thinking to make it relevant to our public and private lives. Its central
thesis is that digital speech is ontologically different from offline
speech and so calls for a more informed response to the harms it can
inflict in order to determine whether legal or extra-legal mechanisms
are most restorative. In spite of a wealth of international norms that
address the value of personal reputation, they have had minimal
influences on regional and domestic laws of the European Union and
the United States, reflecting the deeply rooted cultural differences on
each side of the Atlantic that shape laws of privacy and free speech.
In conclusion, implications for future methods of addressing online
reputational harm outside of traditional legal systems are discussed.
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INTRODUCTION
Legend of early Indo-Europeans tells of the king of Phrygia
tying his cart to a public post with an intricate knot of bark. After
centuries of locals attempting to disentangle the knot, Alexander the
Great devised a simple, but untried solution: he sliced it with his
sword, thereby fulfilling Zeus’ prophecy that the victor would become
king of all Asia. Alexander was clearly thinking outside the box.
This paper likens the current state of reputation law to a Gordian
knot, entangled in complexities and calling for novel thinking to make
it relevant to both our public and private lives. Its central thesis is that
digital speech, meaning communications on social media or other
messaging platforms that are more amateurish, spontaneous and
conversational than well researched speech aimed at a broader
audience, is sufficiently different in kind from offline speech that it
calls for a more informed response to the reputational harms it can
inflict. Due to this ontological difference, rigorous, interdisciplinary
research is needed to determine whether traditional legal responses or
extra-legal solutions will be most restorative. Those harms are not to
be underestimated in the emotional, financial and professional
damage they can impose. They relate to the Internet’s idiosyncrasies
of memory, global distribution, telescoping of time, and the easy
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acceptance of anonymity. Their sting can be felt through online
invective and false stories or unauthorized exposure of personal data.
In order to respond to free expression/privacy tensions, we need to
understand the language, motivations and literacy of trolls, flamers,
anarchists, militants, business competitors, jihadists and all those who
aim to destroy our social, professional and financial identity as
individuals.
This topic has universal importance because the social impact of
lost reputation can be profound. We stand to lose our social and
professional worth at the hands of vengeful ex-lovers, disgruntled
employees or mean spirited trolls who work anonymously. Common
law systems seem incapable of producing legal responses that can
ease that suffering; the Internet, rather than utilizing its enhanced
features of global dissemination and instantaneous response as
steward of our reputational privacy, has served more as facilitator of
harm.
The paper begins by noting that, although international law
offers a wealth of legal norms for the protection of reputation through
the lens of private and family life, those values have failed to inspire
clearly stated laws or jurisprudence on the domestic level. The
disappointing result has been the second tier status that jurists
frequently allocate to reputational privacy in deference to free speech.
While more recent privacy and data protection laws strive to right that
imbalance, few are effective in rehabilitating one’s dignity, honor and
personality rights (as valued in the European tradition) or the
American balancing of a right to be left alone and speech freedoms,
as increasingly informed by the first amendment, section 230 of the
Communications Decency Act,1 and the more recent SPEECH Act.2
That conflict of norms means that, when it comes to online social
media messaging, addressing reputational damage calls for thinking
outside the box.
This paper proceeds as follows: Part I examines international
instruments for their influence on regional (EU) and domestic (US)
law and details how those legal responses have produced quite
discrete bodies of law on each side of the Atlantic, reflecting diverse

1. Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. §230
2. Securing the Protection of our Enduring and Established Constitutional Heritage Act
(SPEECH Act), P.L. 111-223, codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 4101-4105, which bars U.S. courts, both
state and federal, from recognizing or enforcing a foreign judgment for defamation unless
certain requirements, including consistency with the U.S. Constitution and section 230 of the
Communications Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. § 230), are satisfied.
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cultural values that shape them. Part II examines how reputational
harm might be perpetrated and impediments to traditional legal
responses. In Part III the ontological difference between online and
offline speech is explored and extra-legal responses to reputational
jeopardy are canvassed. The paper concludes with suggestions for
future explication of reputational damage from digital speech and
misuse of personal data.
I. INTERNATIONAL & DOMESTIC REPUTATION LAWS
Since the end of World War II, the international community has
formulated a wealth of significant legal conventions that address
reputation, primarily by framing those concerns broadly within values
of privacy, family life, and personal dignity. Signatories acknowledge
our entitlement to those protections as members of the human race.
Although world wars have shrunk to more regional and asymmetric
conflicts in the ensuing decades, the ambit of our interpersonal
communications have gone the other way, expanding from localized
gossip to instantaneous global dissemination of our secrets and stigma
via Internet and social messaging.
We might anticipate, therefore, that the wide selection of
international norms regarding privacy and reputation would provide a
conceptual reference point and inspiration to domestic laws.
Similarly, with the emergence of the Internet and social media as the
dominant interpersonal messaging tools over the past decade, it would
be reasonable to expect the evolution of digital-specific laws to
protect our virtual presence from verbal attacks and data exposure that
jeopardize our future opportunities of a social, professional and
financial nature. Unfortunately for law reform, we see that those
international values seldom seep down to domestic laws or
jurisprudence.
A. Conventions & Declarations
1. UDHR & ICCPR
Two 20th century international instruments expressly address
reputation as a basic human right, the first crafted by United Nations
members as they emerged from the destruction and atrocities of the
Second World War and the second, somewhat ironically, created in
the midst of the Vietnam War of the mid-1960s. The Universal
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Declaration of Human Rights3 (UDHR) and the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights4 (ICCPR) use almost identical
wording to stipulate that “no one shall be subjected to arbitrary
interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to
attacks upon his honor and reputation” and that “everyone has the
right to protection of the law against such interference or attacks.”5
The ICCPR only addresses interference and attacks that are
“unlawful.”6
The UDHR in article 19 also addresses a human right to free
speech “through any medium and regardless of frontiers.”7 Reputation
is treated as a right devolving from social and political life, and is
significantly broader than the protections against violent and arbitrary
treatment with which the UDHR begins. As one source explains, the
UDHR leaves larger scope for variation in different social and
political contexts, because “individuals everywhere have the right to
be free of torture, but different countries may legitimately come to
different conclusions about the conditions under which private
property may be taken for public use.”8 Such differential treatment
sets up the conditions for a hierarchy of rights in actual state practice.
The US and EU Member States have all signed both the UDHR
and the ICCPR and ratified the former treaty.9 Both treaties have
enforcement bodies: for the UDHR several oversight mechanisms are
provided.10 The ICCPR is monitored by the UN Human Rights

3. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/
217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948), at Article 12. International law creates a hierarchy of instruments: a
convention (synonymous with treaty and covenant) is binding between states. Conventions are
stronger than declarations that constitute an agreement of standards without legal enforcement.
Declarations frequently are products of UN Conferences and can be produced by government
representatives or NGOs.
4.International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res 2200A (XXI) A, U.N. Doc. A/
RES/2200A(XXI) (Dec. 16, 1966), at art. 17 [hereinafter International Covenant].
5. Id. Those instruments, in combination with the International Covenant On Economic
Social and Cultural Rights, comprise the International Bill of Human Rights.
6. Id. at art. 17(1).
7. “Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes
freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and
ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.” Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948)
8. Mary Ann Glendon, The Rule of Law in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
2 NW. J. INT’L HUM. RTS. 1, 6 (2004).
9. The US signed on Oct. 5, 1977. EU Member States sign upon gaining EU
membership.
10. Including the Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, the Office of the
UN High Commissioner on Human Rights, the Human Rights Council, and treaty-monitoring
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Committee through regular reports from state parties on
implementation of those rights. In practice enforcement for both
treaties is more nominal than practical, however, with diplomatic
pressure and other ‘soft law’ tools being preferred.
The UDHR is not legally binding as such; it carries no formal
legal obligations but might carry moral obligations or attain the force
of law as customary international law. Most of its rights had already
received a significant degree of recognition by 1948 in the
constitutions of many nations, if not in their practices.
In the case of the ICCPR, the US and all EU Member states that
are parties to the Convention must respect the provisions of the treaty,
subject to reservations, understandings and declarations (RUDs)
requested by other signatories. One controversial RUD of
considerable weight in foreign relations requested that the US
Constitution prevail over any contested free speech issue involving
the terms of the ICCPR. Another key RUD attached by the US Senate
is a “non self-executing” Declaration, intended to limit the ability of
litigants to sue in a US court for direct enforcement of the ICCPR.
That Declaration effectively challenges any external enforcement
mechanism.
Cases relating to reputation that expressly reference the UDHR
and the ICCPR are very limited; one reason might be the strength of
RUDs requested by the US. Another could be the comparatively low
value allotted to reputational harm and privacy invasions on the
international spectrum of human rights violations. Remedies, as
discussed in the UN Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Rights to
Remedies, seem restricted to “gross” violations of International
Human Rights Law and “serious” violations of International
Humanitarian Law, a bar that indignities and social stigma caused by
reputational injury might not be able to hurdle.11
In a report to the ICCPR Human Rights Committee in 2014, the
US was criticized for its surveillance activities on foreign and US
citizens12 that showed non-compliance with the privacy provisions in

bodies like the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women and the
Committee on the Rights of the Child.
11. See Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for the
Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of the
International Humanitarian Law, G.A. Res. 60/147, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/147 (Dec. 16, 2005).
12. Specifically highlighted were NSA’s bulk phone metadata surveillance program (§
215 of the USA PATRIOT Act); surveillance under § 702 of the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act (FISA), conducted through PRISM (collection of communications content
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the ICCPR’s Article 17 and with international law principles of
legality, proportionality and necessity.13 Although reputation rights
were not expressly addressed, the report recommended that any
interference with the right to privacy, family, home or correspondence
henceforth be authorized by laws that: 1) are publicly accessible; 2)
are tailored to specific legitimate aims; 3) detail the precise
circumstances of data collection and obtaining consent, and 4)
provide for effective safeguards against abuse.14 Also listed as
excessive invasions of personal privacy are practices of third parties
such as Internet Service Providers (ISPs) to retain personal data for
state use.15
The Human Rights Committee monitoring state compliance with
the ICCPR has interpreted the convention’s free speech provisions as
describing a much narrower right than that articulated in US
constitutional laws. In any conflict between a US citizen’s free speech
rights and those of a non-US citizen subject to a non-US free speech
law, the US position is likely to prevail due to its wider legal ambit.
That is particularly the case with hate speech, where the US
subscribes to a wide tolerance: only incitement that is intended to
cause imminent violence justifies restricting fundamental speech
rights.16 Some EU states, however, such as Finland, Belgium, Iceland,
and Denmark, oppose the term “hate speech” as potentially restricting
democratic debate on religion and minorities.17 Those speech
protections are broader still than those in American law and can have
injurious results for individual reputation.
The third pillar of an International Bill of Human Rights in
concert with the UDHR and the ICCPR is the UN’s International
Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights created in 1996.
It does not expressly address reputation or privacy. Altogether the
three treaties comprise a wide range of human rights that form an
interrelated normative system.

from United States-based Internet companies) and UPSTREAM (collection of communications
metadata and content by tapping fiber-optic cables carrying Internet traffic).
13. Concluding Observations on the Fourth Periodic Report of the
United States of America, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Human Rights
Committee (Apr. 23, 2014), http://www.refworld.org/docid/5374afcd4.html.
14. Id. at § 20(b) (emphasis added).
15. Id. at § 20(c) and (d).
16. See also Hate Speech, ARTICLE19.ORG, https://www.article19.org/pages/en/hatespeech-more.html (last visited Apr. 7, 2016).
17. Id.
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2. International Convention on Migrant Workers &
Convention on the Rights of the Child
A more recent addition to international law is the International
Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers
and Members of their Families that requires protection for “privacy,
family, correspondence or other communications” against “unlawful
attacks on his or her honour and reputation.”18 With that treaty, even
temporary citizens are afforded a basic right to a good reputation,
although subordinated to “respect for the rights and reputation of
others.”19
Other international instruments and initiatives that are relevant to
reputation include the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child
(prohibiting arbitrary or unlawful interference with a child’s privacy,
family, or correspondence, and unlawful attacks on his or her honor
and reputation);20 the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with
Disabilities (with similar provisions for the disabled, including
protection from unlawful attacks on reputation and privacy rights for
correspondence “and other types of communications”); 21 and the UN
Resolution on a Global Agenda for Dialogue among Civilizations that
urges full utilization of communication technologies including the
Internet to further global dialogue and understanding.22
All of the above reveal international consensus on the
importance of reputation protection as a legal norm. Although

18. International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and
Members of Their Families, G.A. Res. 45/158, U.N. Doc. A/RES/45/158 (Dec. 18, 1990), at art.
14.
19. Id. at art. 13(3)(a).
20. Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res 44/25, U.N. Doc. A/RES/44/25
(Nov. 20, 1989), at Art. 16. (“1. No child shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference
with his or her privacy, family, or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his or her honour
and reputation”) (emphasis added).
21. Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, G.A. Res. 61/106, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/61/106 (Dec. 13, 2006), at art. 22. (“1) No person with disabilities, regardless of place of
residence or living arrangements, shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with
his or her privacy, family, or correspondence or other types of communication or to unlawful
attacks on his or her honour and reputation. Persons with disabilities have the right to the
protection of the law against such interference or attacks; 2) States Parties shall protect the
privacy of personal, health and rehabilitation information of persons with disabilities on an
equal basis with others”) (emphasis added).
22. Global Agenda For Dialogue Among Civilizations, G.A. Res. 56/6, U.N. Doc. A/
RES/56/6 (Nov. 21, 2001), at art. 9 (“Utilization of communication technologies, including
audio, video, printed press, multimedia and the Internet, to disseminate the message of dialogue
and understanding throughout the globe and depict and publicize historical instances of
constructive interaction among different civilizations.”) (emphasis added).
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repeated in regional instruments of the European Union (EU)
reputation law does not trickle down to domestic (national) laws per
se, but only obliquely through laws of defamation or privacy.
B. Regional Responses to Reputation Law
1. European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)
In contrast to the wealth of international treaties that expressly
address reputation, the European Convention on Human Rights
(ECHR)23 does not contain direct references to honor or reputation as
a discrete human right; rather it makes the right of free expression
subject to protection of “the reputation and rights of others.”24 The
use of “reputation” as a qualification rather than a right seems
deliberate, as appears from the preparatory work on Article 10 of the
ECHR.25 The text of the ECHR approaches reputational protection
obliquely, then, as a contingency that would limit free expression,
similar to such occurrences as threats to national security, public
safety, the economic well-being of the state, the prevention of
disorder or crime, the protection of health and morals, and the
protection of the rights and freedoms of others.” 26
Recognition of reputation as a right of equal import to speech
was slow to come in EU case law. In the first defamation case brought
under article 10 of the ECHR, Lingens v. Austria in 1986,27 the

23. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Sept. 3,
1953, 213 U.N.T.S 222, (art. 10(2)) (ECHR), formulated by the Council of Europe after the
Second World War ro provide for the first time human rights within Europe enforceable under
international law and before a court independent of the nation states. Only states that belong to
the Council of Europe can become parties to the ECHR. The ECHR is not an EU instrument,
unlike the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union that came into force in 2000
for all EU member states that assembled into one instrument human rights from several previous
treaties, including the ECHR.
24. Id. at art. 10(2).
25. See also European Commission of Human Rights Preparatory Work on Article 10 of
the European Convention on Human Rights, COUNCIL OF EUROPE, SECRETARIAT OF THE
COMMISSION, Doc. No. DH (56) 15 Or. Fr. (Aug. 17, 1956) (noting the following proposals that
were made but did not appear in the final document: a French proposal that free speech could be
limited by the protection of “the reputation or rights of other persons” (Dec. E/1371, p. 21); a
UN conference on freedom of information suggesting that free speech be restricted by
expressions by other persons that “defame their reputations or are otherwise injurious to them
without benefiting the public.” (§ 2(g) and a similar proposal by the British Government (§
8(3)(2)). Subsequent submissions to a Committee of Experts eliminated all references to
“reputation.”).
26. ECHR, supra note 21, at arts. 8, 10.
27. Lingens v. Austria 8 Eur. Ct. H.R. 407 (1986). Lingens published comments in a
Vienna magazine characterizing behavior of the Austrian Chancellor as “basest opportunism,”
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European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) rejected the
Government’s argument that the case concerned a conflict between
two equal Convention rights; the court held that a right to reputation
only served as qualifier of the right to free expression. With the
Article 10 case of Chauvy and others v. France28 in 2004 and the
article 8 case of Pfeifer v. Austria29 in 2007, however, the right to
protection of reputation was recognized as having full Convention
status. The Pfeifer case decided “a person’s right to protection of his
or her reputation is encompassed by Article 8 as being part of the
right to respect for private life”.30 With that case, European law had
finally incorporated international legal norms expressed by the UDHR
and ICCPR.
That development has its critics: Stijn Smet of the University of
Ghent criticizes the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) for
elevating reputation to convention rights status equal to its “strongest
enemy.”31 Smet cites the ECtHR case of Polanco-Torres (where a
judge’s wife fought defamatory claims that she and her husband
engaged in unlawful business transactions) as a judicial attempt to
balance the human rights pendulum that had swung too far on the side
of reputation with Pfeifer. In Smet’s opinion the court wrongly set a
high standard for proof of harm as one that “compromises personal
integrity.”32 Smet is persuasive in arguing that, by creating the
integrity standard, the ECtHR has created a situational right rather
“immoral” and “undignified.” The Austrian criminal code provided the defense of truth but
Lingens maintained they were value judgments and hence not within the four corners of that
code. The ECtHR agreed and found a violation of Lingen’s article 10 free speech rights without
addressing reputational harm.
28. Chauvy and others v. France, 41 Eur. Ct. H.R. 29 (2005), regarding a book that
suggested by innuendo that Jean Moulin, Resistance Leader in WW2 was betrayed and killed
because of the actions of Raymond Aubrac who escaped. (“The book is little more than pure
conjecture and constitutes a direct assault on the integrity and identity of Mr and Mrs Aubrac
that robs them of their dignity. It is necessary to reaffirm respect for human dignity as one of the
most important Convention values and one which historical works must also foster.”)
29. Pfeifer v. Austria, 48 Eur. Ct. H.R. 175 (2007) (regarding an article alleging the Jews
attacked Germany in 1933 and trivializing the actions of the Nazi regime and stating “A
person’s reputation, even if that person is criticised in the context of a public debate, forms part
of his or her personal identity and psychological integrity and therefore also falls within the
scope of his or her private life under Article 8.”).
30. See also Stijn Smet, The Right to Reputation Under the European Convention on
Human Rights, STRASBOURGOBSERVERS.COM (Nov. 1, 2010), http://strasbourgobservers.com/
2010/11/01/the-right-to-reputation-under-the-european-convention-on-human-rights/.
31. Id. The European Court of Justice (ECJ) rules on European Union law while the
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) rules on the European Convention on Human Rights
which covers the 47 member states of the Council of Europe.
32. Id.
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than balancing an existing right with a competing right of free speech
using the traditional proportionality test. As a result, when applying
the Polanco case “in some situations one enjoys a right to reputation
and in others not.”33
2. American Convention on Human Rights
Across the Atlantic, the American Convention on Human Rights,
promoted by the Organization of American States (OAS) with state
members in North, Central, and South America, sets out the right to
privacy, honour and dignity.34 It prohibits arbitrary interference with
the “right to privacy or one’s reputation” and stipulates that everyone
has the right to protection of the law against attacks or interference
with that right.35 It further subjects the right of expression to a
“respect for the rights or reputations of others.”36 The Convention also
provides for a right of reply to individual complaints of reputational
violations through the designation by every publisher (including
online publishers) of a person without immunity to respond to such
complaints.
The Convention was inspired by the American Declaration of
the Rights and Duties of Man (the Declaration of the Americas) that
marked the modern world’s first general international human rights
instrument, predating the Universal Declaration of Human Rights by
one year.37 The US and Cuba are the only parties not to have ratified
the Convention, and a few states have actually attempted to rescind
their ratification.38 In practice, the OAS and the Convention are seen
as “more Latin American than Inter-American” and there is strong
pressure for the US to become a State Party to alternative OAS InterAmerican treaties.39

33. Smet, supra note 30.
34. Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22,
1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123, Article 11 (“1. Everyone has the right to have his
honour respected and his dignity recognized; 2. No one may be the object of arbitrary or abusive
interference with his private life, his family, his home, or his correspondence, or of unlawful
attacks on his honour or reputation; 3. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against
such interference or attacks.”) (emphasis added).
35. Id.
36. Id. at art. 13, § 2(a).
37. American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, Inter Am. Comm’n H.R.
(May 2, 1948).
38. Trinidad and Tobago has rescinded; Peru tried, but used the wrong procedure.
39. Monica Pinto, The Role of the Inter-American Commission and the Court of Human
Rights in the Protection of Human Rights: Achievements and Contemporary Challenges, 20
HUM. RTS. BRIEF 2 (2013).
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Although not well known outside of the legislative histories of
the parties, the Declaration of the Americas has been referenced in the
jurisprudence of both the Inter-American Court of Human Rights
(IACHR), created by the OAS, and the work of the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights. The latter functions as a court of first
instance and works at enforcement of the Declaration of the Americas
in all OAS Member States.
Akin to its position regarding the ICCPR, the US holds that its
own laws provide the same or stronger human rights protections than
those of the Declaration of the Americas, in spite of its lack of a
centralized data protection regime. As testament, the IACHR
jurisprudence lacks any cases of US origin. Key objections in the US
to OAS rights protections relate to issues of federalism, sovereignty,
and incompatibility with US domestic laws, most prominently the US
Constitution.40 In political terms, US exceptionalism regarding OAS
activities is heavily criticized by other members of the Convention
that aim to exclude US participation.41
In addition, the US is signatory to many of the international
conventions outlined above but on the domestic front, as we shall see,
there is no direct mention in the US Constitution of “reputation” or
“privacy” and data protection laws are formulated on an ad hoc and
sectoral basis, producing a patchwork of protections across the
country.
3. Data Protection in Europe
Reputational privacy can be adversely affected by the
unauthorized disclosure of personal data, an act that occurs each time
Internet users log on to search engines such as Google or the social
networking site Facebook or other web service companies that
transmit their personal identifying information across geopolitical
borders. Companies such as Facebook, Google, Apple, LinkedIn, Dell

40. Id. at 21 (advising the US to ratify the American Convention to show international
leadership regarding human rights).
41. The term “U.S. exceptionalism” is used here to indicate the belief that, unlike other
states, the United States does not need to ratify international human rights treaties because its
domestic legal system provides the same or better protections. See Stephen M. Walt, The Myth
of American Exceptionalism, FOREIGNPOLICY.COM (Oct. 11, 2011), http://foreignpolicy.com/
2011/10/11/the-myth-of-american-exceptionalism. See also Francisco J. Rivera Juaristi, U.S.
Exceptionalism and the Strengthening Process of the Inter-American Human Rights System,
AM. U. HUM. RTS. BRIEF (2012), http://www.wcl.american.edu/hrbrief/20/2juaristi.pdf (noting
that US exceptionalism has left the Inter-American Human Rights System vulnerable to attacks
on its legitimacy and credibility).
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and Intel, for example, store their user data in Ireland, a corporate
decision that translates into massive amounts of user information
leaving countries of origin. As we shall see, data protection policies
within the Council of Europe and European Union member states
build on a long-held cultural respect for dignity of individuals by
sheer virtue of their humanity. Policy makers in the US, by contrast,
give innovative leadership and free speech pride of place in policy
decisions and lawmaking. Those culturally entrenched and political
relevant differences have wide ranging effects on international efforts
to agree on an international technology policy as smart technologies,
including digital communications, are introduced into more and more
areas of society.
With respect to data protection law in Europe,42 two international
instruments are crucial to ongoing oversight of transborder data flow
that could intrude on citizens’ reputational privacy: the Council of
Europe’s 1981 Convention for the Protection of Individuals with
regard to the Automatic Processing of Personal Data (Convention
108),43 and the 1980 Guidelines Governing the Protection of Privacy
and Transborder Data Flows of Personal Data, drafted by the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD
Guidelines).44 Those rules were devised to deal specifically with
personal information that crosses international borders, targeting the
adequacy of protection afforded citizens in the exporting country. The
former, Convention 108, was devised in pre-Internet days and has
42. See generally Meg (Ambrose) Jones, A Right to a Human in the Loop: Legal
Constructions of Computer Automation & Personhood from Data Banks to Algorithms, SSRN
(Aug. 1, 2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2758160.
43. European Treaty Series – No. 108, Convention for the Protection of Individuals with
regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data, COUNCIL OF EUROPE, (Jan. 28, 1981)
[hereinafter ETS No. 108]. The Convention has 53 signatories from Europe, Asia, South
America and North Africa. See also Graham Greenleaf ‘Modernising’ Data Protection
Convention 108: A Safe Basis for a Global Privacy Treaty? 29 COMPUTER. L. & SEC. REV. 4
(2013) (documenting efforts to globalize Convention 108 to protect the transborder flow of data
related to EU citizens and to enjoin non-European states in protection of their citizens within a
globalized information flow and communications environment).
44. Recommendation of the Council Concerning Guidelines Governing the Protection of
Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data, ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND Development (July 11, 2013), http://www.oecd.org/sti/ieconomy/2013-oecdprivacy-guidelines.pdf. See also New Technologies and Their Impact on Regulation, ICT
REGULATION TOOLKIT, http://www.ictregulationtoolkit.org/1.7 (last visited April 7, 2016)
(discussing secondary use of data and enforcement of privacy guidelines); OECD
Recommendation on Cross-border Co-operation in the Enforcement of Laws Protecting Privacy,
OECD.ORG (2007), http://www.oecd.org/internet/ieconomy/38770483.pdf; Jennifer Stoddard,
Thirty Years After The OECD Guidelines, OECD.ORG (2011), http://www.oecd.org/sti/
ieconomy/49710223.pdf (discussing historical overview).
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been described by the European Data Protection Supervisor as the
only legally binding international treaty dealing with privacy and data
protection.45 It outlaws the processing of sensitive data on a person’s
race, politics, health, religion, sexual life, criminal record, etc., in the
absence of proper legal safeguards. The Convention also enshrines the
individual’s right to know that information is stored on him or her
and, if necessary, to have it corrected. It applies to both private and
public authorities, such as police organizations, but has been heavily
criticized for lack of enforcement mechanisms and for its Eurocentered membership.46
Convention 108 places more emphasis on protection of human dignity
and human rights through individual control of our data but does not
expressly mention “reputation” or the personal cost of data misuse.47
So too, the original OEDC Guidelines did not express concerns over
individual reputation; revisions in 2013 mention reputation for the
first time within the context of the “reputational impact” and “loss of
trust or confidence” caused to individuals by organizations that
experience a data breach, whether by inadvertence, negligence, or
victimization at the hands of data thieves.48 Both the 108 Convention
and OEDC Guidelines are under continuous review but, despite those
efforts, they have been criticized as ineffectual, as “burdensome to
those whose motives are benign and ineffective towards those more
malignly inclined.” 49
The EU Directive on the Protection of Individuals with Regard
to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of
Such Data (95 Directive), inspired by Convention 108, was devised in
the mid-1990s when personal computers were not widespread and

45. Questions and Answers, EUROPEAN DATA PROTECTION SUPERVISOR, https://
secure.edps.europa.eu/EDPSWEB/edps/EDPS/Dataprotection/QA (last visited April 7, 2016).
46. Jorg Polakiewicz, Convention 108 As a Global Privacy Standard? INTERNATIONAL
DATA PROTECTION CONFERENCE (June 17, 2011), http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/
DataProtection/TPD_documents/
Convention_108as_a_global_privacy_standards_June_2011.pdf.
47. ETS No. 108, supra 43, at preamble (“that it is necessary, given the diversification,
intensification and globalisation of data processing and exchanges of personal data, to guarantee
human dignity and the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms of every person, in
particular through the right to control one’s personal data and the processing of such data.”).
48. Supplementary Explanatory Memorandum To The Revised OECD Privacy
Guidelines, ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT 26 (2013),
http://www.oecd.org/sti/ieconomy/oecd_privacy_framework.pdf.
49. Sylvia Kierkegaard et al., 30 Years On - The Review of the Council of Europe Data
Protection Convention 108, 23 COMPUTER. L. & SEC. REV. 223, 231 (2011).
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data privacy regulation was viewed as “a niche activity”.50 Both
instruments use technologically neutral language, as does the OEDC
Guidelines, to avoid the dating of laws through reference to specific
technologies that would be replaced over time. 51 What they provide
are broad principles that serve as a template for the more
technologically specific General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)
that was adopted at the EU level on April 14, 2016, after four years of
drafting and negotiations; it is now officially EU law, replacing the 95
Directive and all national data protection legislation.52
While the 95 Directive did not expressly address the protection
of “reputation,” it set out the objective of protecting a “right to
privacy, with respect to the processing of personal data.”53 The GDPR
improves on that with two references to “reputation,” but in the
preamble rather than in the regulation proper:54 the first recognizes
risks to rights and freedoms, such as damage to reputation; the second
reference includes reputational damage in a listing of general
physical, material or non-material damage to natural persons arising
from data misuse.55 Interestingly there were eleven such references in
the working draft.
Other, more innovative, provisions grant the right of access to
data by the data subject56 and the right to an effective remedy for
misuse or leakage, some within a month of the transgression.57 Those
competent authorities have jurisdiction over online activities that fall
within the scope of EU law only, that is, for activities of data
processors located within the EU, whether or not processing is carried
out in the EU.58 Most notable for those who subscribe to a ‘right to be

50. Council Directive 95/46, 1995 O.J. (L 281/31) (EC) [hereinafter 95 Directive].
51. Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee on the ‘Proposal for a Council
Recommendation Concerning the Protection of Minors and Human Dignity in Audiovisual and
Information Services’ (EC) No. 98/C 214/07 of 10 July 1998, 1998 O.J. (C 214) 25, § 3.2.5
(defining technologically neutral language: “Regulation should be ‘technology-neutral’: as few
as possible new regulations, policies and procedures should be specific to the new services.”).
52. Regulation (EU) 2016/679 Of The European Parliament And Of The Council of 27
April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data
and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data
Protection Regulation or GDPR).
53. Counsel Directive 95/46, supra note 50, at art. 1.
54. Such references would provide interpretation guidelines, not law.
55. .GDPR, supra fn 52, Preamble paras. 75 and 85.
56. .Id., at Section 2, particularly Art. 15.
57. .Id., at art. 12.4, Art. 77 and Art. 79.
58. Id. at art. 3.1. It also applies to processing outside of the EU where goods or services
are offered online to EU residents.
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forgotten’ as a reputational privacy mechanism for online content, and
as suggested in preliminary proposals of the European Commission,
the GDPR contains both a right of deletion of personal data and a
right to restrict processing.59 Conditions for granting a right of
deletion include: where the personal data are no longer necessary for
the purposes for which they were collected; the data subject
withdraws the original consent for their use; or they were processed
illegally. A right to restrict personal data processing arises where the
accuracy of the personal data is contested by the data subject; or when
further processing is unlawful or outside the scope of the original
consent.
One concern about the new GDPR regime is the potential
disparity between data collection laws from one member state to the
next. While the GDPR applies uniformly to all EU member states by
virtue of their membership, and legal uses of data are set out in
Article 6, (by consent, to perform a contract, for legal obligations or
public interest tasks of the controller,), there is some wiggle room
under 6(2) for individual states to further define which activities are
legally permissible within its borders; it remains to be seen how
Internet services that transmit data across internal borders of the EU
might get entangled in those legal differences from one country to the
next.
Data transmission and storage have increased considerably with
the new mobility of messaging and the novel features offered on cell
phones and tablets. With such major shifts in the portability of data,
and the unconstitutionality of the US-EU safe harbour arrangements
as decided by the CJEU in the Maximillian Schrems case,60 the EUUS Privacy Shield has come into effect. Its emergence and
importance for reputational privacy will be discussed below.61

59. Id. at art. 17 and 18 respectively.
60. Maximillian Schrems v. Data Protection Comm’r, Case C-362/14, 6 October 2015
(Schrems I).
61. As early as 1999 the ARTICLE 29 Working Party, a group of European data
protection officials, was of the opinion in 1999 that the “patchwork of narrowly focused sectoral
laws and voluntary self regulation [of US data transmissions] cannot be relied upon to provide
adequate protection in all cases for personal data transferred from the European Union.”
WORKING PARTY ON THE PROTECTION OF INDIVIDUALS WITH REGARD TO THE PROCESSING OF
PERSONAL DATA, Opinion 1/99 concerning the level of Data Protection in the United States and
the Ongoing Discussion between the European Commission and the United States Government,
at p. 4, DG MARKT DOC 5098, WP 15 (Jan. 26, 1999).
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4. E-Privacy Protection in Europe
Two additional EU directives relate expressly to online
information and aim at protecting personal reputation. The Electronic
Commerce Directive, (e-Commerce Directive 2000)62 provides legal
certainty for EU businesses and consumers alike on issues such as
information requirements for online service providers,63 the execution
of electronic contracts, and limitations of liability of ISPs.64 Under the
e-Commerce Directive, ISPs are subject to the law of the Member
State in which the service provider is established. In turn, the Member
State whose residents receive the service cannot arbitrarily restrict
incoming services.65
The second directive influencing online personal data is the
Directive on the Retention of Data (e-Privacy Directive)66 that relates
to publicly available electronic communications or public networks,
such as mobile phone and texting data plan companies. The Directive
requires those companies to store citizens’ telecommunications data
for a minimum of 6 months and a maximum of 24 months, to allow
for official scrutiny by government agents if authorized by law, and is
intended to curb data retention beyond an individual’s original
consent. The e-Privacy directive enables the police and security
agencies to access details such as the IP address and time of use of
every email, phone call and text message sent or received. A 2014
decision of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU),
Digital Rights Ireland Ltd. v Ireland & Karntner Landesregierng &
others, ruled certain provisions of the e-Privacy Directive
unconstitutional in that they are so broad as to permit mass
surveillance by state authorities that challenge fundamental human
rights.67

62. Directive on Certain Legal Aspects of Information Society Services, in Particular
Electronic Commerce, in the Internal Market (Directive on Electronic Commerce) (EC) No.
2000/31 of June 8, 2000, O.J. [hereinafter e-Commerce Directive].
63. For example, agents who receive tax information filed online.
64. The EU Single Market: E-Commerce Directive, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, http://
ec.europa.eu/internal_market/e-commerce/directive/index_en.htm (last updated Mar. 20, 2014).
65. Id.
66. Directive on the Retention of Data Generated or Processed in Connection with the
Provision of Publically Available Electronic Communications Services or of Public
Communications Networks and Amending Directive 2002/58/EC (EC) No. 2006/24 of 15
March 2006, O.J. [hereinafter ePrivacy Directive].
67. Joined Cases C-293/12 and C-594/12, Digital Rights Ireland Ltd. v Ireland &
Karntner Landesregierng et al., 2014 E.C.R. (April 8, 2014) (seeking preliminary ruling on
ePrivacy Directive (OJ 2006 L 105, p. 54) in the light of Articles 7, 9 and 11 of the CHARTER OF
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION [Digital Rights Ireland]).
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In conclusion, throughout the 20th century European efforts to
protect reputation produced a centralized body of statutory law that,
as we will see below, contrasted with developments in America.68 The
persistent influence over the ages of the Roman law of ius natural or
natural justice can be seen as an enduring theme in harmonizing laws
requisite for the formation of the EU. Today, Europeans continue to
look to EU statute law to protect their fundamental interests in
reputational privacy.
The rights status granted to reputation in several international
conventions has not been readily reflected in the state laws or
jurisprudence of individual EU Member States. One explanation
might be that rights to privacy have historically been addressed
through actions for civil and criminal defamation, breach of
confidentiality and insult law, precedent that has undergone a
particular uneven history in terms of its conceptual development, its
location in public or private law, and the requisite evidentiary
standards of proof for a claim in either civil or criminal law.
Gradually, the courts of the EU have acknowledged protection of
reputation as a full status right. Most recently, the results of the
Schrems and Digital Rights Ireland cases have signaled CJEU
heightened concerns over data privacy during transatlantic
transmission of data pertaining to EU citizens. That transmission has
been accelerated by innovative technologies that have enabled
wireless transmission, digital messaging and government data
surveillance, all of which have implications for reputation rights.
C. Domestic Responses in the US Relative to European Nations
Concern for reputational privacy and data protection has moved
in a very different direction in the US than in Europe.69 There is no
mention of “reputation” in the US Constitution, although freedom of
speech figures prominently in the First Amendment and privacy in the
Fourth. Neither is there is any federal data protection law, and
individual privacy rights were not recognized in federal law until the
Privacy Act 1974, despite a proposal for one by Warren and Louis

68. Paul M. Schwartz and Karl-Nikolaus Peifer, Prosser’s Privacy and the German Right
of Personality: Are Four Privacy Torts Better than One Unitary Concept? 98 CALIF. L. REV.
1925, 1947 (2010).
69. The US Constitution is silent on reputation rights, although case law on free speech
has obliquely created legal parameters for protection of personal reputation. See further for
historical perspective, George C. Christie, Injury to Reputation and the Constitution: Confusion
And Conflicting Approaches, 75 MICH. L. REV. 43 (1976).
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Brandeis near the close of the 19th century.70 State privacy laws have
evolved to fill the legislative gap in a sector-specific and ad hoc
fashion that creates doctrinal and procedural discrepancies between
one state and another regarding, for instance, public laws in health,
industry and insurance. In the absence of statutory guidelines, the
common law has developed, albeit with uneven results. The
development of data protection laws has followed a similar course.
For reputational damage perpetrated onto another, the common
law offers defamation law, privacy law and, under the influence of
UK practices, breach of confidentiality.71 US causes of action tend to
focus on loss of social esteem and goodwill or a loss of social capital
in economic terms. In contrast, legal principles of continental Europe,
reflected in the ECHR and other statutes, tend to link reputation to
one’s dignity or honor among peers. To defame that dignity is to
challenge the positive public appraisal of the person; to damage
another’s honor is to mar the self-appraisal of his own public
significance.72
In Harvard Dean William Prosser’s estimate, the common law of
defamation is full of “absurdities for which no legal writer ever has
had a kind word.”73 Without going into detailed case analysis, the
following principles indicate the intricacies and inconsistencies of
defamation jurisprudence that bear out Prosser’s assessment. In the
US, truth is accepted as an absolute defense in some state
jurisdictions, but not in others.74 Truth is not accepted as a defense in
privacy invasion cases that involve damages to reputation. A
statement does not need to be literally true in order for this defense to

70. Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (Publ. L. No. 93-579), 88 Stat. 1896 (31 Dec.
1974); see further, Louis Brandeis & Samuel Warren, The Right to Private Property, 4 HARV. L.
REV. 193 (1890).
71. A case for defamation should exhibit the following elements: the publication to third
parties of a harmful statement about the plaintiff that causes her public embarrassment and/or
professional and financial suffering, and is made without adequate research into the truthfulness
of the statement. When those elements are present, and the plaintiff is reduced in the social
estimation of her community as a result, a private case in defamation is usually made out at
common law.
72. Defamation and Freedom of Expression, COUNCIL OF EUROPE, MEDIA DIVISION,
DIRECTORATE GENERAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS (March 2003). In addition, the French Press Act of
1881 remained faithful to the spirit of the 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man and of Citizens
that proclaimed the freedom of the press “save to respond to the abuse of this liberty, in the
cases determined by the law”, ie to defamatory statements (art. 11). For American-European
cultural differences in perceptions of privacy, see James Q. Whitman, The Two Western
Cultures Of Privacy: Dignity Versus Liberty, 113 YALE L. J., 1151 passim (2004).
73. WILLIAM PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS, 737 (4ed. 1971).
74. Cf. a claim for invasion of privacy in the US where truth provides no defense.
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be effective, just substantially true in the legal sense. This means that
even if the defendant states some facts that are false, if the “gist” or
“sting” of the communication is substantially true, then the defendant
can prevail.75 A plaintiff who is a public official or celebrity must
prove both falsity and malice on the part of the defendant.76 The US
Supreme Court has held that private individuals can secure a remedy
in defamation simply by proving negligence, as opposed to a higher
standard of intent on the part of a media defendant.77
Similarly, a 2015 study of EU civil defamation laws regarding
how helpful they are to journalists, concluded that most were unclear
and confusing and that, when writing for publication, “vagueness is
the name of the game” to escape civil liability.78 Only Ireland,
Macedonia and the UK were named as having passed legislation
specific to defamation that reasonably conforms to international
standards and that would assist journalists.79
Further confusion has been experienced in both Europe and the
US over criminal defamation laws that use penal sanctions to respond
to insults, criticism and defamatory behavior involving public
officials and heads of state. Such laws are remarkably widespread:
nearly 20 US states retain criminal defamation laws;80 within the EU,
20 member states have retained criminal defamation laws on their
books despite persistent pressure to repeal them.81
The development of privacy law in America in response to
reputational injury was much more meticulous in its taxonomy due in

75. Gomba v. McLaughlin, 180 Colo. 232, 236 (Colo. 1972).
76. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 285-292 (1964). Sullivan did not
prevail, as he could not establish that the statements were made with actual malice or that they
related to him.
77. Gertz v. Welch Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
78. . Scott Griffen, OUT OF BALANCE: Defamation Law in the European Union: A
Comparative Overview for Journalists, Civil Society and Policymakers, http://
legaldb.freemedia.at/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/IPI-OutofBalance-Final-Jan2015.pdf
(providing a comparison of defamation laws in EU states).
79. The study also notes that Austria, Croatia and Luxembourg have passed general
media legislation that specifically addresses defamation and provides most relevant defenses.
80. David Pritchard, Rethinking Criminal Libel: An Empirical Study, 14 COMM. L. &
POL’Y, 303 (2009) (listing Colorado, Florida, Idaho, Kansas, Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota,
Montana, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Utah,
Virginia, Washington, Wisconsin, Puerto Rico and the US Virgin Islands as having criminal
defamation laws). Colorado repealed its criminal defamation laws in 2012.
81. Defamation Laws in Europe - Media Laws Database, INTERNATIONAL PRESS
INSTITUTE, http://legaldb.freemedia.at/defamation-laws-in-europe (last visited April 8, 2016)
(listing only Cyprus, Montenegro, the United Kingdom, Ireland, Romania, Macedonia and
Estonia as having repealed criminal defamation laws).
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large measure to William Prosser. He devised an intricate inventory
of laws to address not only invasions into personal seclusion but such
wrongs as appropriation of the name of another, public disclosure of
private facts “not a matter of legitimate public concern”, and
disclosure of private facts that portray the victim in a false light.82 The
law of privacy in America thereby veered away from the European
model, including the law of confidentiality, to create a new
conception of privacy based on the individual’s “inviolate
personality.”83
Prosser’s work has been criticized as too regimental in its
categorization. For victims of reputational exposure, his privacy torts
present a confusing and often illogical combination of legal principles
and practices. For example, they contain such arbitrary inclusions as
the “right of publicity” (that protects a celebrity’s intellectual property
from misappropriation and hence financial deprivation) within the
“appropriation” category (that protects the private person from the
emotional harm of unwanted publicity). To some, such results
produce contrivances that do not work well in practice.84
Most controversial are the uneven results played out in court. For
example, false light claims are recognized in only about two-thirds of
US states due to their doctrinal overlap with defamation actions.
There are distinctions, however, that justify Prosser’s inclusion of
both torts. For instance, false light actions are not subject to limitation
and retraction statutes unlike defamation actions. In terms of
substantive differences, false light claims have no access to defenses
available to the press in defamation actions: while truth is a complete
defense to defamation, true statements are actionable under false light
law.85 Journalists must therefore be particularly wary of attracting
false light claims because defendants can be successful even if the
story is true in its entirety.86

82. William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383 (1960).
83. Neil M. Richards & Daniel J. Solove, Prosser’s Privacy Law: A Mixed Legacy, 98
CALIF. L. REV. 1887 passim (2010).
84. Neil M. Richards & Daniel J. Solove, Privacy’s Other Path: Recovering the Law of
Confidentiality, 96 GEO. L. J., 123, 125 (2007) (arguing that Warren and Brandeis did not invent
the law of privacy from meager precedents of the common law but took it in a new direction).
85. Patricia Avidan, Protecting the Media’s First Amendment Rights in Florida: Making
False Light Plaintiffs Play by Defamation Rules, 35 STET. L. REV. 227 (2005).
86. See, e.g., Gannett Co. v. Anderson, 947 So. 2d 1 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006) (where the
owner of a road-paving company was awarded $18.28 million for a true report that he had shot
his wife but that provided a statement that the authorities ruled the shooting accidental two
sentences after the original mention of the shooting, thereby putting his name in a false light.
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As well, false light requires the dissemination of offending
content to a wide audience, whereas defamation claims can rest on the
perceptions of a smaller number of recipients. The principal doctrinal
difference rests in the interest the law seeks to protect: defamation
protects the objective interest of reputation while false light protects
the subjective interest of emotional injury causing personal
embarrassment, helplessness or mere hurt feelings.87 The conceptual
vagueness of those terms has prompted journalists to complain about
the tort’s chilling effect on their First Amendment rights.88
Those transatlantic discrepancies in legal responses to
reputational privacy threats exist within a broader nationalization
trend that illustrates state authorities are beginning to take more notice
of the risks of exporting their citizens’ personal data. In Europe, for
example, German’s privacy federation has threatened to sue US-based
Pokemon-Go developer Niantic Labs for over 15 violations of
German privacy law;89 and in France, the data protection regulator
CNIL90 fined Google for failure to conform on a global scale with the
“right to be forgotten” as ruled by a 2014 ECJ judgment.91
In the US, libel chill has been addressed with passage of the
SPEECH Act92 that renders unenforceable any foreign defamation
judgment against US journalists unless they are consistent with US
laws and procedures, including the First Amendment, section 230 of
the Communications Decency Act93 and US standards of due process.
In other words, foreign judgments must be “consistent with that
which a US court would have reached on the facts, if the defamation

The decision was overturned on appeal in Anderson v. Gannett Co., 994 So. 2d 1048 (Fla.
2008)).
87. Getting It Right, But in a “False Light,” REPORTERS COMMITTEE FOR FREEDOM OF
THE PRESS, http://www.rcfp.org/browse-media-law-resources/digital-journalists-legal-guide/
getting-it-right-false-light-0 (pointing out that some states hold that false light claims can
concern untrue implications, not directly false statements).
88. Thereby offending the constitutional standard that “Congress shall make no law . . .
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to
assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.” (emphasis added). U.S.
Const. amend. I.
89. David Mayer, Pokémon Go Maker Is Facing a Privacy Lawsuit Threat in Germany,
Fortune (July 20, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/07/20/pokemon-go-germany-privacy/.
90. Commission Nationale de l’Informatique et des Libertes. Google argued it complied
by scrubbing search results from its European subsidiaries (Google.fr and Google.de).
91. Kayla Haran, France Fines Google Over Global Right to be Forgotten, HARV.J. L. &
TECH (Apr. 4, 2016), http://jolt.law.harvard.edu/digest/privacy/france-fines-google-over-globalright-to-be-forgotten.
92. Supra, note 2.
93. Supra, note 1.
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had occurred in the United States.”94 Defamation is broadly defined in
the SPEECH Act as “any action or other proceeding for defamation,
libel, slander, or similar claim alleging that forms of speech are false,
have caused damage to reputation or emotional distress, have
presented any person in a false light, or have resulted in criticism,
dishonor, or condemnation of any person.”95 The italicized inclusions
harken to laws of insult in medieval Europe or present-day repressive
regimes.96
Rules governing transatlantic export of personal data from EU
countries by US Internet companies have changed considerably since
the Schrems decision in 2015. With safe harbor agreements
pronounced unconstitutional by the CJEU, the EU and US have had to
build consensus regarding a workable balance between free speech
and privacy rights for personal data transfers out of EU member
states. The resulting self-certification Privacy Shield (IP/16/216) was
signed in July of 2016 and governs all data flow of personal data from
the EU to the US and particularly aims at commercial transactions
between the two jurisdictions.97 Salient provisions include notification
to data subjects by commercial participants of the use being made of
their data including third party use; mechanisms the data subject can
use to access that data; and ways that the US Department of
Commerce will cooperate with EU data protection authorities to
facilitate claims of non-compliance by data subjects. The principles
that frame the Privacy Shield mirror those of the GDPR regarding
consent, notification, data retention guidelines, and publication of
non-compliance actions by the appropriate authorities. As of this
writing, the agreement is undergoing review by the Article 29 privacy
advocacy group in Europe and privacy specialists in the US.
II. PRACTICAL HURDLES FOR PROSPECTIVE LITIGANTS
The Gordian knot metaphor suits the complex and often puzzling
interplay of conceptual principles and practice outcomes in reputation

94. Emily C. Barbour, The SPEECH Act: The Federal Response to ‘Libel Tourism’,
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE (Sept. 16, 2010), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41417.pdf.
95. Supra note 2, at § 4101(1).
96. Ruth Walden, Insult Laws: An Insult to Press Freedom, WORLD PRESS FREEDOM
COMMITTEE (2000), http://www.wpfc.org/site/docs/pdf/Insult%20Laws-Text.PDF.
97. Passage of the Judicial Redress Act H.R.1428 - 114th Congress (2015-2016) was a
pre-condition to the agreement; it grants EU citizens the right to enforce data protection rights in
the U.S. a key stipulation of the EC negotiators. For details see Welcome to the EU0US Privacy
Shield, https://www.privacyshield.gov/welcome.
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law. A layer of complexity is added to the mix by social media; it
seems that features of the Internet that make it most attractive for
every kind of informational exchange also contribute to a type of risk
more permanent and severe than legacy journalism and what we used
to call mass media. Those idiosyncrasies raise several legal and
practical questions that call out for analysis. The following are key to
reputational harm perpetrated online.
A. Gradients of Harm & Other Issues of Proof
It is the remedy that bridges the gap between the ideal and
the real, or, rather, between norms and fact.98
Tort law holds promise for reputational redress due to its focus
on harm to the plaintiff rather than wrongdoing by the defendant: it
looks to liability, not blame. Historically libel damages were
presumed, in recognition of the reputational stigma that the written
word could compel. Today, that presumption has narrowed to
defamation -per se (obvious defamation) cases.99 Beyond that,
particularly in cases of innuendo or inducement, litigants must prove
actual (or special) damages in order to recover.100
Innuendo can play a major part in social media defamation cases
because the extrinsic facts it references add meaning to the truncated
and fragmentary nature of tweets, emails or Facebook postings. That
was illustrated in the 2013 London High Court case of Sally Bercow,
wife of the current Speaker of the House of Commons in the United
Kingdom who tweeted, “Why is Lord McAlpine trending? *innocent
face,*” thereby implicating a former Conservative Member of
Parliament. 101 The court found the contents were sufficient when
combined with several other media accounts to link McAlpine to a
child sex abuse scandal and so found for the plaintiff. The court
98. Helge Dedek, From Norms to Facts: Realization of Rights in Common and Civil
Private Law, 56 MCGILL L. J. 77 (2010) (comparing the “lively” discourse in common law
regarding converting rights to remedies to civil law jurisdictions where “the concept of remedy
remains a mystery”.)
99. Per se actions have historically been reserved for cases related to charges that a
person has contracted a contagious or venereal disease; that a woman is of unchaste character;
for other untrue statements that tend to injure a person in his profession, trade, or business; or
accusations of crimes involving moral turpitude.
100. See generally UK Defamation Act 2013 (2013 UK Act), Chapter 26 that sets out to
rebalance, rather than rewrite, the common law of defamation. It sets the requisite standard of
harm at serious damage, thereby weeding out more trivial cases, but also doing away with the
presumption of reputational harm.The defendant retains the defense of truth, but s/he must prove
a statement is substantially true.
101. McAlpine v. Bercow [2013] EWHC 1342 (QB).
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reasoned that Bercow’s 56,000 Twitter followers, as well as a similar
number of potential news subscribers, would comprehend the
meaning of the “innocent face” (identified as a type of “stage
direction or a emoticon” directing the reader to imagine that the
expression on the tweeter’s face is “one of innocence. . .[indicating]
she does not know the answer to the question.”)102 Sufficient extrinsic
value was found in the concurrent coverage of the child sex scandal
by radio and print media to render Bercow’s offending tweet as
defamatory.
The Bercow case exemplifies a few novel issues of proof raised
by social media cases. The High Court found that average readers of
the tweet would find its tone “insincere and ironical”, an observation
that falls short of the traditional legal standard of falsehood of a
defamatory statement but, in the instant case, contributed to evidence
that found for the plaintiff.103 Further, Bercow’s reference to
“trending” stories added to her liability by implicating her in several
media reports produced at the same time. That finding assumes
Twitter followers were necessarily aware of those news accounts and
read them into Bercow’s tweet, rather than dismissing the message as
an “unfathomable, twitter ‘in-joke’” as one source suggests.104 An
ancillary question is whether Bercow is necessarily rendered a public
figure with a finding of malice added to the list of evidentiary
requirements, due to the extensive readership the Twitter medium
attracts.105
Courts exhibit reticence to acknowledge a legal expectation of
privacy when dealing with social media speech as can be seen in the
US where the mere creation of a Facebook account disqualified a user
from such claims,106 or a student’s posting of his poem on a MySpace
account convinced a school principal of his right to hand over the
student’s poem to the local newspaper for publication.107
Jurists and school personnel are not alone in their confusion over
the privacy landscape for digital speech: users as well exhibit

102. Id. per Mr. Justice Tugendhat, at § 7.
103. Id. at § 84.
104. Hugh Tomlinson, Case Law: McAlpine v Bercow (No.2), Sally Bercow’s Tweet Was
Defamatory, INFORRM’S BLOG (May 24, 2013), https://inforrm.wordpress.com/2013/05/24/caselaw-mcalpine-v-bercow-no-2-sally-bercows-tweet-was-defamatory-hugh-tomlinson-qc.
105. That question is posed with reference to US defamation law in Matthew Lafferman,
Do Facebook and Twitter make you a Public Figure? How to Apply the Gertz Public Figure
Doctrine to Social Media,” 29 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J. 199 (2012).
106. See, e.g., Romano v. Steelcase Inc., 907 N.Y.S. 2d 650 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2010).
107. Moreno v. Hanford Sentinel Inc., 172 Cal.App.4th. 1125, 1130 (2009).
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unfamiliarity with the scope of their audiences, as shown in US
entertainer Courtney Love’s insistence that she believed her offending
tweet was sent directly to one recipient, not to Twitter readers at
large,108 or Sally Bercow’s argument that her Twitter followers
numbering in the tens of thousands should not be calculated as
including those who read general news reports.
Another challenge is dealing with standards of proof for digital
speech and wireless messaging tools with laws created for the era of
wiretaps, radio and postcards.109 In legal terms, jurists’ cobbling of
pre-Internet law onto digital speech cases has added to that confusion
and led to more than a few awkward charges: for example, using
trespass to chattels charges for email hacking,110 assault by Internet,111
and intentional infliction of emotional distress for overly expressive
texts.112 One of the most gymnastic applications of common law
causes of action to social media is use of breach of confidential
relationship where no prior close relationship ever existed. The
practice is routinely used in the UK and exemplified in the Max
Mosley case (discussed below).113 It signals a need for better
understanding of both technological capabilities of the medium and
the ontological uniqueness of digital speech.
The view that novel media might require discrete legal solutions
can be seen in arguments of the defense team of US entertainer
Courtney Love, as discussed above. Love had tweeted to a very large
fan base that Mafia members had placed illegal influence on her
former lawyer. In America’s first “twibel” case, the defense proposed
that it is the nature of tweets to use “hyperbole and exaggeration” that
are not to be scrutinized too carefully or taken as carrying deeper
meaning.114 In asking that claims made via Twitter not be held to the

108. Corina Knoll, Singer-actress Courtney Love wins landmark Twitter libel case, LA
Times (Jan. 24, 2014), http://articles.latimes.com/2014/jan/24/local/la-me-love-libel-20140125.
109. For commentary on cultural differences regarding expectations of privacy for
postcards, see also Steven D. Zansberg & Janna K, Fisscher, Privacy Expectations in Online
Social Media - An Emerging Generational Divide?, Communications Lawyer (Nov. 20, 2011),
http://www.lskslaw.com/documents/evolvingprivacyexpectations(00458267).pdf.
110. Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 30 Cal. 4th 1342, 1347 (2003).
111. Marquez v. Reyes, Civil Action No. 10-cv-01281-BNB, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
65701 (D. Colo. June 10, 2010).
112. Clay Calvert, Fighting Words in the Era of Texts, IMS and E-Mails: Can A
Disparaged Doctrine Be Resuscitated to Punish Cyber-Bullies?, 21 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART &
ENT. L. & POL’Y 1, 23 (2010).
113. Mosley, infra at 122.
114. As referenced in Patrick H. Hunt, Tortious Tweets: A Practical Guide to Applying
Traditional Defamation Law to Twibel Claims, 73 LA. L. REV. 559, 560 nn.13-14 (2013).
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same legal standards as speech used by offline news organizations,
Love’s counsel were suggesting that the law of defamation shift to
create a lesser category of speech with less stringent publishing
standards when digital media are used, particularly given its
unmediated status.115
Traditional remedies also provide a challenge in that they might
prove impractical for digital speech cases where the majority of
defendants are citizen journalists without deep pockets. In a preInternet study, the most sought-after defamation remedy was
pecuniary,116 even though plaintiffs admitted to its lack of
effectiveness in meeting litigants’ expectations.117 The damage award
for super model Naomi Campbell, for example, after several years of
litigation in three levels of court and a widening circle of negative
publicity, was a nominal £3,500.118 By 2010, however, an Iowa study
reported that the preferred solution was retractions, a possible
reflection of social media users’ realization that much wider
audiences would access an online retraction or apology notice than
when traditional media are used. Internet scholar David Ardia also
points to the deterrence provided by the growing capricious nature of
damage awards on both sides of the Atlantic.119 Other recent remedies
for defamation have included containment through injunctions120 and
erasure mechanisms contained in some US and EU laws promoting le
droit l’oubli, a personal right to be forgotten.

115. See Hunt, supra note 114, 559 passim (arguing that Twitter is a revolutionary
communications platform in that it enables, for the first time in modern communications,
participation of the average citizen with celebrities, major news networks, and politicians).
116. Damage awards are customarily allocated in two categories, compensatory (or actual)
damages and punitive damages (known as exemplary damages in Cyprus, England and Wales
where they are extremely rare). There are other modifying terms placed in front of the word
damages like “liquidated damages,” (contractually established damages) and “nominal
damages” (where the court sets a figure to reprimand the defendant, such as awards of one
dollar).
117. Randall Bezanson, Libel Law and the Realities of Litigation: Setting the Record
Straight, 71 IOWA L. REV. 226, 227 (1985).
118. Campbell v. MGN Ltd, [2004] UKHL 22, [14] (Eng.), 2 A.C. 457.
119. David S. Ardia, Reputation in a Networked World: Revisiting the Social Foundations
of Defamation Law, 45 HARV. CIV. RTS-CIV. LIB. L. REV. 261, 262 (2010). In the US, large
damages continue to be awarded to a small number of plaintiffs.
120. David S. Ardia, Freedom of Speech, Defamation, and Injunctions, 55 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 4 (2013) Note 15 (reporting that of fifty-six decisions involving injunctive relief in US
defamation cases well over half were found to have been delivered since 2000 and over half by
separate calculation, involved Internet speech. As well, the nature of injunctive relief awarded
has been either disproportionate to the harm threatened or technologically infeasible).
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The erasure remedy is highly controversial within the common
law world as it represents a category of solutions that pose
technological difficulties when dealing with online content. 121 In the
Lord McAlpine case, above, the British peer sought damages against
a number of “high profile Tweeters,” identified as users with more
than 500 followers, who retweeted Bercow’s message, thereby
enabling further third party dissemination of the original message.
The anonymity of many citizen journalists would pose a further
impediment to such remedies.
Calculating a gradient of harm for different ways to offend
reputational privacy online is a complex undertaking: how does one
prove damages given the uber accessibility, archiving capabilities and
ongoing third party dissemination capabilities afforded by social
media technologies? Nonetheless, some high profile figures have
pursued litigation and have attempted to articulate damages and the
further harm to reputation they or their families have suffered as a
result of going to court. For example, wealthy lawyer and auto racing
figure Max Mosley, the subject of online dissemination of images by
News of the World in a fictitious media story of a Nazi-themed sex
party,122 spoke of “enormous and continuous damage”123 that became
“totally devastating” for his wife of 48 years and his sons for whom
he could think of “nothing more undignified or humiliating.”124
Although successful in the originating jurisdiction, Mosley then faced
mirror actions in 22 countries due to the replicative nature of online
content, and at great personal cost.
Similar issues faced American single mother Lorraine Martin
who sought enforcement of a Connecticut erasure law for arrest news
of criminal charges against her that were ultimately withdrawn. She
describes the nightmarish realities of job searching in the shadow of
such headlines as “Mother and sons charged with drug offenses.”125
As well, plaintiff Gonzales in the Google Spain case, discussed
further below, found employment and social opportunities were

121. Bill Keller, Erasing History, NEW YORK TIMES (Apr. 28, 2013), http://
www.nytimes.com/2013/04/29/opinion/keller-erasing-history.html?_r=0.
122. Mosley v. News Group Newspapers Ltd. [2008] EWHC 687 (QB).
123. Max Mosley Wins His Case Against Google in France, COLLYERBRISTOW.COM
(Nov. 6, 2013), http://www.collyerbristow.com/news/press-release-max-mosley-wins-his-caseagainst-google-in-france.
124. Mosley Wins Court Case Over Orgy, BBC NEWS (July 24, 2008), http://
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7523034.stm. Mosley also spoke of his elder son’s suicide during
proceedings.
125. Keller, supra note 121.
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denied him due to persistent online accounts of his previous debt to
social services authorities that cropped up each time he Googled his
name.
One source cites the disparities in litigation outcomes as proof of
need for a more contextual or nuanced approach: “common law courts
attach extremely divergent legal consequences to impugned
statements based on indefensibly broad generalizations about the
degree of danger to personal reputation posed by the medium in
which the statement was communicated.”126
B. Jurisdiction & Choice of Law
Personality rights have been described as one of the most
contentious areas of private international law127 in that the instant
personal data or defamatory content crosses national borders the issue
of a multistate conflict of laws arises.128 Such magnified exposure
creates two immediate legal decisions for a plaintiff: where to sue and
under which law. For those who find their privacy exposed by
unauthorized use of their personal data, those questions are not easily
answered. For EU victims, national data protection agencies are the
first step, with subsequent judicial review provided by the CJEU; for
US victims, the answer involves a sector-by-sector review of
available legal remedies.129
Given the unique architecture of Internet communications, such
reputational harm now crosses borders widely, instantaneously and
far more frequently. That activity brings the non-European website
operator within the four corners of two EU legal instruments: the

126. Robert Danay, The Medium is not the Message: Reconciling Reputation and Free
Expression in Cases of Internet Defamation, 56:1 MCGILL L.J. 1, 1 (2010).
127. Csongor Istvan Nagy, The Word is a Dangerous Weapon: Jurisdiction, Applicable
Law and Personality Rights in EU Law – Missed and New Opportunities, 8 J. PRIVATE INT’L. L.,
251, 253 (2012).
128. See also Tamas Dezlo Czigler, Choice of Law in the Internet Age: US and European
Rules, 53 HUNGARIAN J. LEGAL STUD. 193 (2012).
129. For example, the national Privacy Act, 1974 could be invoked for privacy breaches
caused by federal civil servants; the Electronic Communications Privacy Act 1986 updates the
Federal Wiretap Act of 1968, addressing concerns originating over wiretapping but now
extended to protect wire, oral, and electronic communications; children’s personal data exposure
could involve the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA); and the federal
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) addresses health data breaches by federal
employees.
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Brussels I Regulation130 (Brussels I, governing the jurisdiction for
hearing transborder civil matters) and the Rome II Regulation131
(Rome II, addressing the choice of laws that will apply to noncontractual obligations). The third instrument, the E-Commerce
Directive, is also involved in data transfer as it addresses publication
of information on the Internet, particularly the issue of whether an ISP
functions as a “mere conduit” or a controller of such information.
What becomes important under Brussels I is not the location or
domicile of the plaintiff but that of the defendant and, due to the
variety of recognized exemptions, the geo-location where harm is
experienced.132
With respect to reputational disputes, Rome II has been a most
anticipated mechanism for clarifying “all matters relating to privacy
and personality rights, including defamation.”133 It marks an effort by
the EU to coordinate judicial decision-making regarding the import
and export of online information of citizens within its member states.
Such harmonization could reduce or eliminate forum shopping for
plaintiffs.
Unfortunately for legal clarity and predictability, defamation law
is not included in the provisions of Rome II at present, withdrawn at
the eleventh hour due to a flood of protest from the publishing
industry as well as a lack of consensus between the European
Commission and the Council of Europe.134 Negotiations continue.135
Brussels I, with provisions addressing non-contractual conflicts
involving torts and including the media, holds that jurisdiction is to be

130. Council Regulation (EC) No. 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on Jurisdiction and the
Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, O.J. (L 012)
[hereinafter Brussels I].
131. Council Regulation (EC) No. 864/2007 of 11 July 2007 on the Law Applicable to
Non-contractual Obligations, O.J. (L 199/40) [hereinafter Rome II].
132. For a more detailed analysis of Brussels I, see The Brussels I Regulation (No 44/
2001), Ch. 1, DUTCH CIVIL LAW, http://www.dutchcivillaw.com/content/brusselsone011.htm
(last visited April 8, 2016).
133. On July 11, 2007 the European Parliament and the Council adopted the ‘Rome II’
Regulation on the law applicable to non-contractual obligations (OJ L 199, 31.7.2007, p. 40).
Under Article 1(2)(g), ‘non-contractual obligations arising out of violations of privacy and rights
relating to personality, including’ are excluded from the Regulation’s scope.
134. Symeon C. Symeonides, Rome II and Tort Conflicts: Missed Opportunities, 56 AM. J.
COMP. L. 173 (2008).
135. Jan-Jaap Kuipers, Towards a European Approach in the Cross-Border Infringement
of Personality Rights, 12 GERM. L. J. 1681, 1697 (2011), (describing thirteen options for
violations of privacy and personality rights discussed in preparatory meetings of the Rome II
committee).
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exercised by the EU country in which the defendant is domiciled,
regardless of his/her nationality.136 In the case of legal persons,
domicile is the country where they have their central administration or
principal place of business. For Google Inc., for example, domicile
could be Mountain View, California but if the suit involves an
individual plaintiff domiciled in France, the matter could involve
Google France and hence a French court. Brussels I also provides that
jurisdiction can be determined by the “place where the harmful event
occurred.”137 That provision complicates the issue by creating a
number of possibilities along the chain of causation. In the German
case of Bier BV v Mines de Potasse d’Alsace, the CJEU interpreted
that clause to mean either the domicile of the defendant who posted
the defamatory content or the domicile of the plaintiff who suffered
the resulting publicity.138 That interpretation was made in pre-Internet
days, however, when points along the causal chain were more easily
identified.139
More recently, the CJEU took the opportunity to address the
“Gordian knot” that the jurisdiction and choice of law issues have
become in defamation and invasion of privacy cases with the enjoined
Internet cases eDate Advertising and Oliver Martinez.140 The
claimants alleged that their personality rights had been infringed as a
result of online publications on websites that were based in different
EU Member States than those in which they lived. In eDate
Advertising, the plaintiff was a German national and resident that had
been convicted of murdering a well-known actor in 1993 and released
on parole in 2008.141 He complained that the Austrian website
publisher eDate Advertising, infringed his personality rights by
reporting his full name, conviction for murder, and the fact that he

136. Brussels I, supra note 132, at art. 2.
137. Id. at art. 5(3) for all torts (non-contractual matters).
138. Case 21/76, Bier BV v. Mines de Potasse d’Alsace, 1976 E.C.R. 1735 [BIER]. See
generally Nagy, supra note 127.
139. The Bier issues were revisited in 1996 CJEU cases of Shevill v Presse Alliance SA.
See Case C-68/93, Fiona Shevill, Ixora Trading Inc., Chequepoint SARL and Chequepoint
International Ltd v. Presse Alliance SA, 1995 E.C.R. I-415 (determining that harm occurs where
the defamatory material is accessed or read (offline newspapers in this case), not where the
publisher is headquartered or where the plaintiff is located when discovering the offending
content).
140. Joined Cases C-509/09 & C-161/10, eDate Advertising v. X and Olivier Martinez &
Robert Martinez v. MGN Limited, 2011 E.C.R. I-10269.
141. Id.
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was appealing his conviction.142 The Bundesgerichtshof or Federal
Court of Justice for Germany asked the CJEU for a preliminary ruling
on the applicability of Brussels I regarding jurisdiction and the
enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters143 as well
as the e-Commerce Directive relating to matters of tort published on
the Internet.144
In the companion case Martinez, the French actor Olivier
Martinez complained of an infringement of his privacy and of the
right to his image by the UK-based Sunday Mirror website in an
article entitled”Kylie Minogue back with Olivier Martinez.” The
online coverage used a dated photograph to erroneously suggest
Martinez had reunited with a former girlfriend.145 Domestic courts
faced arguments from the commercial defendants that the court did
not possess authority to make orders restricting publication outside
their jurisdictions.
The CJEU confirmed for both cases that infringement of
personality rights by Internet can be litigated either in the EU
Member State where the publisher is established or where the
plaintiff’s “centre of interests” is based, a finding that did not bring
clarity to existing law.146 The decision acknowledged that the law of
conflict might not be of much assistance within the unique context of
Internet communications because Internet distribution is “universal,”
“intended. . .to ensure the ubiquity of that content,” and calls into
question the whole “centre of interests” concept.147
The decision in eDate Advertising and Oliver Martinez
acknowledges the borderless nature of the Internet but does little to
simplify the law for its extraterritorial transmission of data; it
underscores the need for innovative thinking when it comes to online
behavior.
C. The Half Life Debate
Much literature addressing new media communications has us
believing that reputation-damaging postings are permanent or at least

142. Nagy, supra note 127, at 252-253 (acknowledging that personality rights and privacy
are much broader concepts than libel and defamation and might cover, for example, the right to
human dignity, bodily integrity, and private communications).
143. Id. at note 43.
144. Id. at note 28.
145. eDate Advertising, supra note 140.
146. Id. at § 48.
147. Id.
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highly persistent and accessible.148 The “right to be forgotten” raised
by the European Commission in the context of both extant and
pending data protection legislation advocates recognition of a human
right to delete personally damning content and past social mistakes
that pervade online spaces with an “iron memory.”149 The concept can
be seen as both “intuitive and widely appreciated” in European
thinking and lawmaking;150 so too in America, given the ethos of
second chances from which the new nation was forged.151 Hence there
is potential for deeper and more enduring harm than with offline
defamatory statements because of protracted access to personal data
by an expanded audience. Internet users, particularly young ones,
receive ample warnings of the permanence of online memory from
industry, educators, and family.152 Bert-Jaap Koops warns of
apprehension or that “distinct feeling of unease” provoked when
suddenly data from the past re-emerges in unexpected contexts.153
In contrast, several digital-savvy scholars maintain that online
content is short-lived. They speak of the evanescence of texting and
SNS communications, a concept that “eases the force of a blow” of
defamation.154 Among proponents of the half-life debate is Harvard
history scholar Jill Lepore who assesses the Web as ethereal, unstable
and unreliable. She cites two studies that offer empirical proof of the
transience of online academic sources. In the first, a 2013 survey of
legal policy-related journals identified a near-fifty percent loss in
workable URLs over six years.155 The second study, at Harvard Law
School, found over 70% loss of URLs cited in the Harvard Law
Review and other journal articles, as well as a 50% attrition of URLs
within US Supreme court opinions. Lepore notes the frequency with
which the error message “Page not Found” is the result of our online
search efforts and concludes, “[s]ocial media, public records, junk: in
148. See also DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON: TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY IN
THE INFORMATION AGE 8 (2004).
149. Bert-Jaap Koops, Forgetting Footprints, Shunning Shadows: A Critical Analysis of
the ‘Right to Be Forgotten’ in Big Data Practice’ 8 SCRIPTed 1 (2011).
150. Id. at 2.
151. LAWRENCE FRIEDMAN, GUARDING LIFE’S DARK SECRETS: LEGAL AND SOCIAL
CONTROLS OVER REPUTATION, PROPRIETY, AND PRIVACY passim (2007).
152. Mike Lata, Snapchat Tells FTC That Your Private Photos Never Actually Got
Deleted, TECHTIMES (May 12, 2014), http://www.techtimes.com/articles/6853/20140512/
snapchat-image-sharing-images-photos-videos-fcc-privacy-online-privacy.htm.
153. Koops supra, note 149, at 2.
154. Anita Bernstein, Real Remedies for Virtual Injuries, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1457 (2012).
155. Jill Lepore, The Cobweb: Can the Internet Be Archived? THE NEW YORKER (Jan. 26,
2015), http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2015/01/26/cobweb.
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the end, everything goes.”156 Both of those studies relate half-life to
the amount of time that content remains accessible and functionally
useful while online.
Also promoting an evaporation theory are computer engineers
Daniel Gomes and Maroi Silvia. Their 2006 study suggests that, in
that year, just over half (55%) of content remained online after one
day, 41% after a week, 23% after 100 days, and 15% after a year.157
Meg Angelo of Georgetown University in turn suggests that
“information is not permanent, no matter the medium” and calls for
principled information storage practices.158 She attributes
disappearing content more to technological malfunctions such as
media and hardware errors, software failures, network service
failures, component obsolescence, operator errors, natural disasters,
internal and external attacks, and organizational failures.159 In the end,
the half-life debate is of little comfort to reputational privacy victims
whose exposure endures long after their usefulness or authorization
has expired.160
D. The Attribution Problem
Attribution can be defined as the identification of users or data
subjects through their online data. Anonymity defeats attribution
attempts. Identifying who comprises the plaintiff’s online community
is algorithmically challenging with the use of widespread anonymity
and third party dissemination.161 Messages and images are accessed
by persons who never have, or probably never will, meet the plaintiff
or speak the same language. That open availability of content is
assisted by permanent archiving capabilities and low entry costs of
the medium.
Anonymity is used for two principal reasons, to protect the
privacy of the data subject and to avoid responsibility for one’s online
behavior. Our vulnerability to invasive technology at the hands of the

Id.
Daniel Gomes & Mario J. Silvia, Modeling Information Persistence on the Web,
PROCEEDINGS OF THE VI INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON WEB ENGINEERING, 1 (2006).
158. Megan Angelo, You Are What Google Says You Are, WIRED (November 2, 2009),
http://www.wired.com/business/2009/02/you-are-what-go/.
159. Id.
160. Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL, Google Inc. v Agencia Española de Protección de
Datos, Mario Costeja González, 2014 E.C.R. 317 [hereinafter Google Spain] (reporting the
offending news account remained online for 16 years before the CJEU ordered it removed).
161. See generally Amy Kristin Sanders, Defining Defamation: Community in the Age of
the Internet, 53 COMM. L. & POL’Y 231 (2010).
156.
157.
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state is accelerating at an alarming pace in the digital era. Through
use of deanonymizing technology and the combination of seemingly
discrete bits of information,162 data analysts can pierce the public/
private divide we believe we enjoy as citizens of a democratic state.
For example, we have been told that our gender and sexual
preferences can now be ascertained from a mere examination of our
use of the “like” function on Facebook.163 Similarly we have been
alerted that we are only four mobile phone conversations away from
government identification.164
In addition to increasing surveillance capabilities of many
governments, we are learning that much personal data sold to
commercial advertisers is not anonymized before being sold.165 The
degree of anonymizing becomes a critical factor in determining what
is “personal data,” “personally identified information,” or “personally
identifiable information” when constructing privacy or data protection
legislation.166 Those definitions, and hence the type of data that is
regulated, differ from one country to the next, making consensus on
privacy standards and anonymity a complex objective.
E. Legal Immunity of ISPs
1. The Communications Decency Act Meets Google Spain
Legislative and judicial treatment differs on each side of the
Atlantic regarding the legal accountability of ISPs for harmful content
they distribute or invasive data retention practices they employ.167 In

162. Daniel Solove, Justice Scalia’s Dossier: Interesting Issues About Privacy and Ethics,
CONCURRING OPINIONS (April 29, 2009), http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2009/
04/justice_scalias_2.html.
163. Rebecca J. Rosen, Armed with Facebook ‘Likes” Alone, Researchers Can Tell Your
Race Gender and Sexual Orientation, THE ATLANTIC (March 12, 2013), http://
www.theAtlantic.com/technology/archive/2013/03/armed-with-facebook-likes-aloneresearchers-can-tell-your-race-gender-and-sexual-orientation/273963/.
164. Matt Warman, Online Anonymity: Impossible After Four Phone Calls, THE
TELEGRAPH (Mar. 25, 2013), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/news/9952841/Onlineanonymity-impossible-after-four-phone-calls.html.
165. See also Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011) (holding that a Vermont
statute that restricted the sale, disclosure, and use of records that revealed the prescribing
practices of individual doctors violated the First Amendment).
166. Paul M. Schwartz & Daniel L. Solove, The PII Problem: Privacy and a New Concept
of Personally Identifiable Information, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1814 (2011).
167. This area of law is in flux in both the US and EU, generating a large body of litigation
for the courts and government watchdogs such as the Federal Communications Committee in
America and the International Telecommunications Union in Europe. US Internet service
providers maintain either that their role is as intermediary between those who post the content
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Europe, the ECHR provides the doctrinal basis for protection of
personal privacy and the sanctity of family life; human rights case law
applies those principles as adjudicated by the ECtHR. EU data
privacy regulation and policies, such as detailed in GDPR, require
data controllers to provide data subjects with unambiguous notice of
what information is being collected, why it is gathered, and who will
be able to access it. Those laws inform domestic law in each EU
Member State, although front line decisions regarding ISPs rest in the
hands of national data protection agencies.
The European formal position, then, is that operations of Internet
companies that involve their citizens be subject to rigorous laws of
anti-competition, data protection, and content liability. The Google
Spain decision identified ISPs and Internet content hosts as
controllers of content with legal liability and pro-active
responsibilities regarding privacy-sensitive content.
US judges are far less likely than their European counterparts to
find Internet companies or ISPs liable for the hosting and distribution
of defamatory content due to First Amendment protections and the
sweeping immunity afforded by the Communications Decency Act.
Section 230 of that law provides that “[n]o provider or user of an
interactive computer service shall be treated as a publisher or speaker
of any information provided by another information content
provider.”168
Such wording broadly exempts from liability any linking or
other exchange of online content between service providers, leaving
the regulation of online privacy to individual users through “clickwrap agreements.”169 Those contracts, unwieldy in length and
complexity, grant individual access to websites and applications and
hence various Internet content. Their terms are non-negotiable from

(publisher) and the subject of the content (individual user), or that they are data processors under
an agency arrangement with the publisher. EU data regulations define a processor as a “separate
legal entity with respect to the controller who process [sic] personal data on his behalf” while a
controller is any body that “determines the purposes and means of the processing of personal
data.” Opinion 1/2010 on the Concepts of “Controller” and “Processor,” Working Party
Document 169, ARTICLE 29, DATA PROTECTION WORKING PARTY (Feb. 16, 2010), available
at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/index_en.htm.
168. Supra note 1.
169. The compulsory clicking of “I agree” to terms of service in order to access a
particular site or service. See also Ryan J. Casamiquela, Contractual Assent and Enforceability:
Cyberspace, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 475, 475–76 (2002) (detailing numerous contract court
decisions from the 1990s and early 2000s). See Andrew W. Bagley & Justin S. Brown, Limited
Consumer Privacy Protections Against the Layers of Big Data, 31 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH.
L.J. 483 passim (2015).
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the user’s perspective. Unacceptable terms can be dealt with by nonparticipation in the service or registering complaints with the Federal
Trade Commission (FTC) about deceptive practices. Although the
Federal Communications Commission (FCC), the other major US
agency involved in the regulation of online activities, embarked upon
a strategy in 2015 to centralize requirements for ISPs regarding Do
Not Track mechanisms, industry response has been uneven and selfregulation remains the business practice for now.170
More broadly, US privacy law is regulated through sectorspecific federal and state laws. Consequently, a consent-based regime
links users to primary parties but does little to reveal subsequent use
of their data and what that consent truly entails.171 The Matthew
Drudge case illustrates that even active participation by an ISP can
garner protection within US jurisprudence.
Matthew Drudge is an Internet gossip columnist,172 most noted
for breaking the President Clinton-Monica Lewinski story. He was
contracted to America On-Line (AOL) for a series of news stories he
posted on an AOL enabled website that were distributed by email to
subscribers. The Drudge Report promoted itself as a particular species
of new media: a US-based “news aggregator.”173 The AOL, as ISP for
those columns, had the right to remove content under its standard
terms of service, and arguably could be considered an editor or
controller of content for its active involvement in the selection of
material to publish. Drudge posted the gossipy content, which
provided links to other articles and sources of news. In one such story
Drudge reported domestic abuse by Sidney Blumenthal, a prominent
member of President Clinton’s administration.174 Blumenthal sued
both Drudge and AOL for defamation. By invoking section 230 of the
Communications Decency Act and disavowing any activities as

170. In general, the FCC oversees Internet infrastructure while the FTC regulates content.
There is some confusion of roles when dealing with net neutrality.
171. Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the New Common Law of
Privacy, 114 COLUM L. REV. 583, 587 (2014).
172. The Drudge Report provided links to upcoming political and entertainment stories
and “predicted” various public sector scandals.
173. Kaley Leetaru, New Media vs. Old Media: A Portrait of The Drudge Report 20022008, FIRST MONDAY (July 6, 2009), http://journals.uic.edu/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/2500/
2235 (arguing that the Drudge Report relied heavily on wire services and obscure news outlets
to find small stories that would break large in future days, making it highly dependent on
mainstream “old media” sites).
174. Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44 (D.C.C. 1998).
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publisher, AOL was successfully removed as a defendant, despite its
input to content and the editorial oversight it provided.
While the appellate court questioned the carte blanche extended
to ISPs under the Communications Decency Act and berated their
freedom to “flaunt a rumormonger’s ability to make rumors instantly
accessible to its subscribers and then claim immunity,” the court
upheld the originating court’s decision all the same.175
The Communications Decency Act was originally introduced to
combat youth-directed pornographic content on the Internet.176
Criticism of the generous ambit of section 230 grows with the wide
berth it affords ISPs.177 Free speech proponents continue, however, to
praise the legislation as the vanguard of Internet liberalism and noncurated content, such as that produced by citizen journalists.178
EU law has generally taken a stricter view of liability for ISPs
than that of the US. Under the Technical Standards Directive, a
“service provider” for purposes of establishing liability is defined as
any person or entity providing an “information society service” which
means any services offered for remuneration at a distance by
electronic means.179 Similarly, the eCommerce Directive affords an
ISP immunity from liability only when it serves as a “mere
conduit”180 or provides “temporary caching”181 for the sole purpose of
making the transmission of content more efficient. The Directive is

175. Id. at 51.
176. Nebraska Senator Exon proposed the original draft of the CDA in the mid-1990s. See
Robert Cannon, The Legislative History of Senator Exon’s Communications Decency Act:
Regulating Barbarians on the Information Superhighway, 49 FED. COMM. L.J. 51 (1996).
177. See also JOEL R. REIDENBERG ET AL., SECTION 230 OF THE COMMUNICATIONS
DECENCY ACT: A SURVEY OF THE LEGAL LITERATURE AND REFORM PROPOSALS, CENTER ON
LAW AND INFORMATION POLICY REPORT (CLIP) FORDHAM UNIVERSITY (Apr. 25, 2012); Ryan
Dyer, The Communication Decency Act Gone Wild: A Case for Renewing the Presumption
Against Preemption, 37 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 837 (2014); Sheri Wardwell, Communications
Decency Act Provides No Safe Harbor Against Antifraud Liability for Hyperlinks to Third Party
Content Under the Securities And Exchange Act, 6 WASH J.L. TECH. & ARTS 49 (2010).
178. See, e.g., Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act: The Most Important Law
Protecting Internet Speech, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION, https://www.eff.org/issues/
cda230 (promoting § 230 as sound legal policy allowing for “YouTube and Vimeo users to
upload their own videos, Amazon and Yelp to offer countless user reviews, craigslist to host
classified ads, and Facebook and Twitter to offer social networking to hundreds of millions of
Internet users”).
179. Directive Laying Down a Procedure for the Provision of Information in the Field of
Technical Standards and Regulations (EC) No. 98/34 of 22 June 1998, art. 1(2), 1998 O.J. (L
204).
180. e-Commerce Directive, supra note 64, art. 12.
181. Id. at art. 3.
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used in cases of copyright infringement, defamation, and invasion of
privacy. Immunity is also provided if the ISP service is of a mere
technical, automatic and passive nature, and where the ISP has no
actual knowledge or control over the content being transmitted or
stored.182
Personal data retention by telecom service providers is regulated
under a separate ePrivacy Directive.183 Such laws requiring the
retention for government purposes of location and traffic data of
individual users were found to violate the ECHR in 2014.184 As a
result, service providers now have a legal basis on which to refuse
compliance with national data retention obligations, although the
decision is unclear as to which remedies are available to individual
users whose personal data is disclosed. It is difficult to imagine such
restriction on government surveillance practices in America.
The individual right to seek takedown requests from ISPs, and to
have them give serious consideration to those requests, is of particular
interest to courts in Europe.185 An often-cited example involves the
conviction for invasion of privacy and defamation of three Google
executives at the hands of a Milan court of first instance in 2010.
Residents of a small Italian town complained that a YouTube video of
schoolmates taunting an autistic student lingered online for a couple
of weeks before Google administration removed it.186 The Milan court
found that that period of time allowed extensive access by countless
online viewers. Google argued a guilty verdict might require it to
filter content on all YouTube videos before they was posted, which it
claimed would be incompatible with the spirit of an open Internet as
well as the tenor of several European directives and guidelines. The
executives were given a suspended sentence and fine.187 On appeal
the “mere conduit” defense of the Google executives was accepted
and the convictions overturned.188

182. Id. at art. 42. As affirmed in the CJEU decision of Case C-70/10, Scarlet Extended
SA v. Société belge des auteurs, compositeurs et éditeurs SCRL (SABAM), 2012 E.C.R. 4.
183. Eprivacy Directive, supra note 66.
184. Digital Rights Ireland, supra note 67.
185. As reflected in the “right to be forgotten” proposed by the GDPR and detailed in the
CJEU reference decision, supra note 160.
186. Loek Essers, Google Video Trial to Continue to Italian Supreme Court, PCWORLD
(April 17, 2013), http://www.pcworld.com/article/2035387/google-video-trial-to-continue-toitalian-supreme-court.html. Google Inc. purchased YouTube on Nov. 13, 2006.
187. Privacy actions are addressed through the criminal law in Italy.
188. Bogdan, Italian Supreme Court: Google’s YouTube is just a hosting provider, EDRI
(Feb. 12, 2014), https://edri.org/italian-supreme-court-search-engines-just-hosting-providers/.
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The more clear-cut intercontinental differences between
European and American legal treatment of ISPs are beginning to blur.
With the long-awaited Google Spain decision, the CJEU advanced the
autonomy of users and data subjects in two significant ways: it judged
Internet companies to be “controllers” of data information involving
EU citizens; and it granted those citizens unprecedented autonomy
regarding the collection, processing, leakage, and mobility of that
information. Prior take-down requests had been limited to information
deemed illegal by a court, such as in defamation, privacy or breach of
confidentiality cases, pirated content, malware, child sexual abuse
imagery and other content prohibited by local law such as material
that glorifiesNazism in France.189
Control of the individual over her personal information was
limited in other ways before Google Spain. People were not notified
of which data identifying them was being collected, profiled, or
shared with other institutional or commercial third parties. Such
activities increased individual risk of hacking, loss, negligent
handling, or other activities that jeopardized their privacy. If leaks,
exposure or loss occurred, there was little legal compensation offered
the data subject. That lack of transparency hid the extent and
acceleration of the exposure problem: an IBM study in 2013 revealed
that globally “more than half a billion records of personally
identifiable information—including names, emails, credit card
numbers and passwords—were stolen.”190
2. Terms Of Service Meet Schrems v Facebook
The 2014 reference case of Maximillian Schrems v. Data
Protection Commissioner of Ireland involved a challenge to routine
exportation of the Austrian law student’s Facebook data from Ireland
(where subscriber data of many Internet companies resides) to the US
(the corporate headquarters of such technology giants). Many
postings were of a very personal nature.191 The CJEU ruled as

189. David Drummond, We Need to Talk About the Right to be Forgotten, THE GUARDIAN
(July 10, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/jul/10/right-to-be-forgotteneuropean-ruling-google-debate (setting out formal criteria according to the UK Google head).
190. IBM Security Services 2014 Cyber Security Intelligence Index (June 2014, https://
media.scmagazine.com/documents/82/ibm_cyber_security_intelligenc_20450.pdf.
191. “[E]very ‘poke’, friend request and invitation (and response) he had sent since setting
up an account in 2008” according to Robert Levine, Behind the European Privacy Ruling that’s
confounding Silicon Valley, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 9, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/11/
business/international/behind-the-european-privacy-ruling-thats-confounding-siliconvalley.html?_r=0.
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unconstitutional the EU-US Safe Harbor agreement enabling crossborder transfer of EU citizens’ data as it did not meet privacy
protection as required by EU fundamental rights legislation.192
Schrems pointed as proof to the 2013 revelations of Edward Snowden
concerning the surveillance activities of the US intelligence services
focusing on EU citizens.
On the American side of the Atlantic, such activities might be
scrutinized for First Amendment violations but otherwise are
considered a matter of individual freedom of contract and selfregulation through subscribers’ privacy settings. Facebook defended
its broadly based terms of service that license the social media
company to use subscribers’ content in any way it sees fit: for
example, Facebook can transfer or sub-license its rights over a user’s
content to another company or organization and all such uses continue
after the deactivation or deletion of a user’s account. Facebook loses
this license only once all other users that have interacted with the
content have also deactivated their accounts.
The case highlights the heightening tension between the
libertarian values promoted by Silicon Valley entrepreneurs and EU
regulators who focus on the regulation of privacy as a human right. In
the wake of the CJEU reference case, Schrems suggests three options
for Facebook, Google and other implicated US companies: “moving
data to Europe, encrypting data that is stored in the United States or
reviewing the corporate structure.”193
III. TREATING DIGITAL SPEECH DIFFERENTLY
Of increasing promise for addressing reputational protections are
extra-legal activities such as the ad hoc assemblage of online
communities to lobby for user interests whenever unilateral actions by
companies or governments threaten online privacy. Another emerging
practice is that of online review and ranking systems where positive
accomplishments or services of individuals can be promoted and false
claims can be unearthed. This section briefly canvasses both a more
formal adjudicatory two-tiered system addressing social media harms
to reputation and extra-legal suggestions.

192. Schrems, supra note 60.
193. Data Protection Authorities in Ireland, Belgium and Germany requested to review
and suspend Facebook’s data transfers over US spy programs, EUROPE V. FACEBOOK (Dec. 2,
2015), http://www.europe-v-facebook.org/prism2_en.pdf.
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A. The Speech Conundrum & A Separate Space
The democratization of online communications has produced
spontaneous, a-contextual and unmediated speech – environmental
factors that some argue merit less weight and meaning in legal
terms.194 That debate raises the judicial practice of discerning “high”
from “low” speech.195 Discussions of high level speech that is well
researched and aimed at a broad audience, as distinguished from low
level speech that is more amateurish, spontaneous and conversational,
suggest a value-laden gradient of social good. If we were to debate
the value of messages via new media such as video blogging,
podcasts, or texting where content can be more off the cuff,
fragmented or emotional, we might argue the content has less social
currency because it is of little public interest.196 We could suggest that
fewer constitutional protections would be justified regarding such
speech because it comprises the daily back-and-forth of minutiae,
humor, hyperbole and commentary. We could leave the more
egregious, hurtful or inflammatory examples for penal treatment
under the criminal law, with its elevated standards of proof.
Rowbottom suggests it is only with the “persistence and searchability
of digital messaging” that the scrutiny of prosecutors and litigators
becomes involved.197 He concludes, however, that such amateur and
casual speech merits some legal response and in proportion to the
harm inflicted.
Internet scholar Yuval Karniel supports a different view: that a
rumor or other offhand comment does not have elevated status just
because it is online: its reliability is still “restrained and
incomplete.”198 The credibility of sources, so critical to public
acceptance of traditional media accounts, is often suppressed or
absent in online accounts. Cues about authority and status of either
the writer or sources are often hidden or absent. As one psychological
study of Internet behavior points out, in cyberspace what mostly

194. Yuval Karniel, Defamation on the Internet: A New Approach to Libel in Cyberspace,
2 J. INT’L MED. & ENT. L. 215, 219 (2009).
195. See further, Jacob Rowbottom, To Rant, Vent and Converse: Protecting Low Level
Digital Speech 71 CAMBRIDGE L. J. 355, 367 (2012) (for a UK perspective).
196. That is the approach of European courts in cases involving freedom of expression
under Article 10 of the ECHR.
197. Rowbottom, supra note 195, at 366.
198. Karniel, supra note 194, at 231.
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influences listeners is the speaker’s skill in communicating coupled
with “persistence, creative ideas and technical know-how.”199
David Mangan suggests digital speech should be a qualified
social good, dependent on our responsible participation in the digital
conversation.200 We already allot different values to various kinds of
speech, such as the positive contributions of political speech and
speech appearing in legacy journalism. He urges us to rein in the
expansive berth that defamation law has allotted to free speech now
that social media speech is challenging the status quo.
Criminal and civil court remedies involve so many features that
argue against using traditional litigation for online speech: cost,
delays, uncertainty of outcome, mandatory criminal sanctions. It
would be worthwhile, then, to consider starting with the premise that,
outside of egregious threats of harm warranting immediate police
attention, digital speech has no social value at all, save those of
venting or conveying subjective impressions, banal messages,
opinions, gossip or innuendo.
Legal actors struggle with how to define and measure the effects
of digital speech on others. Internet defamation researcher Lyrissa
Lidsky notes it occurs in a space where hyperbole and exaggeration
are routine and venting is as commonplace as careful and considered
argumentation.201 She concludes it is the side-by-side existence of
both styles of speech in online communications reporting that creates
uncertainty about the verifiability of digital speech.202
One argument for treating digital speech as a discrete species of
communication is that Internet content is “located in another time and
zone,” more anecdotal and immediate, and so should not be subjected
to the investigative rigors of traditional journalism or the legal
standards of proof for defamation.203 In the Oregon case of Obsidian
Financial Group. LLC v. Cox, a blogger Courtney Cox posted
allegations of fraud, corruption and money laundering involving the
plaintiff, a bankruptcy consultation business. Cox liberally injected
her posts with hyperbolic terms such as “immoral,” “thugs,” and “evil

199. John Suler, The Online Disinhibition Effect, 7 CYBERPSY. & BEH. 321, 324 (2004).
200. David Mangan, Regulating for Responsibility: reputation and social media,
International Review of Law, Computers & Technology DOI: 10.1080/13600869.2015.1008960
(2015).
201. Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Silencing John Doe: Defamation & Discourse in Cyberspace
49 DUKE L.J. 855, 863 (2000).
202. Id.
203. Karniel, supra note 194, at 218.
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doers.”204 The US 9th Circuit Appellate Court applied its test in
Unelko Corp. v. Rooney205 to find that the very tenor of blog language
used by Cox “negates the impression that [she was] asserting
objective
facts.”206
The
statements
were
posted
on
obsidianfinancesucks.com, a URL indicating that any reader would be
predisposed to view them with a certain amount of scepticism and an
understanding that they likely presented one-sided viewpoints rather
than assertions of provable facts.
Karniel argues that the role of blogs, tweets, and other citizen
journalism is to serve as a vetting function, providing preliminary
flagging of issues that the mainstream offline press can review for
stories worthy of further investigation, sober thought and publication.
Regarding the role of law in addressing defamatory remarks online,
Karniel makes two proposals: either create a sub-category of law for
virtual speech with more lenient levels of proof or remove it
altogether from judicial scrutiny.207
Others have observed the legal predisposition to treat social
media messaging as a less important form of speech garnering fewer
constitutional protections.208 That distinction is particularly noted
within the employment context.209 Much of social media language
already evades traditional causes of action because it comprises
gossip, opinion, insult, vitriol, hyperbole and creepiness.210
B. Moving Beyond The Slander-Libel Distinction
Distinguishing between the written and spoke word for litigation
purposes made some sense in pre-Internet days when text was
considered more damning because it endured over time, whereas the
spoken word was ephemeral and, unless recorded, was unavailable at

204. Obsidian Fin. Grp., LLC v. Cox, 812 F. Supp. 2d 1220, 1233 (D. Or. 2011).
205. Unelko Corp. v. Rooney, 912 F.2d 1049, 1053 (9th Cir. 1990).
206. Obsidian Fin. Grp., LLC v. Cox, 740 F.3d 1284, 1294 (9th Cir. 2014).
207. Karniel, supra note 194, at 231 (rationalizing that most of us do not believe what we
read online in any event).
208. Richard Sanvenero, Social Media and our Misconceptions of the Realities, 22 INF. &
COMM. TECH. L., 89 (2013) (referring to social media, not as an absolute social good, but a
“disease”).
209. David Mangan, A Platform for Discipline: Social Media Speech and the Workplace,
Osgoode Legal Studies Research Paper 85 (2015), http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/
olsrps/85 (observing speech in traditional media in Canada and England is better protected than
that of workers using virtual social platforms as it affects corporate reputation).
210. For an analysis of the latter see Omer Tene & Jules Polonetsky, A Theory of Creepy:
Technology, Privacy and Shifting Social Norms, 35116 Y. J. L. & Tech 59, 61 (2013).
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a later time. Such distinctions have lost relevance as our
communications have migrated online. 211
It is a complex task to determine which cause of action best
serves the non-traditional nature of online communications. For
example, is a YouTube video actionable as libel or slander? What of
podcasts? Chats? Facebook Befriending? Twitter messaging? What
about consumer commentary displayed below a video? Is texting an
abbreviated form of writing or speaking? What of gestures in videos?
Further research into the nature of social media speech could address
those uncertainties.
The Internet has several idiosyncrasies that confound traditional
categories of offending speech. New media communications can be,
for example, truncated into digital semaphore;212 non-curated;
internationally accessible; consensually anonymous and interactive;213
sent with impetuosity and archived in perpetuity with low entry
costs.214 Posted or texted content can inform, alert, persuade, or
convert, but it can also confound the recipient or judge who needs
some method of translation to decode the cryptic terms, fragmentary
style and emotional overtones. In the extreme, it is its own language
and context.
Linguist John McWhorter of Columbia University still works
within the traditional distinctions when he suggests digital messaging
is more speaking than writing. “Texting isn’t written language,” he
claims, “[i]t much more closely resembles the kind of language we’ve
had for so many more years: spoken language.”215 Texting is
patterned after speaking, McWhorter proposes, — looser, telegraphic,
and less reflective. We lack tools, however, to make a complete
conversion: pencils, typewriters, even computers have historically
proven too slow to keep up with the pace of human speech. The speed
and convenience of texting on our mobile phones or tablets just might
achieve that.

211. Leslie Yalof Garfield, The Death of Slander, SSRN, available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1916212.
212. Employing terms such as “btw” or lmao that need context and cultural cues to
determine intent.
213. Karniel, supra note 194, at 220 (confirming anonymity is well accepted by cyber
culture).
214. Rowbottom, supra note 195, at 356 (noting that “Words typed in seconds followed by
hitting the enter key can lead to a criminal record or costly civil litigation.”).
215. Michael V. Copeland, Texting isn’t Writing; it’s Fingered Speech’, WIRED (Mar. 1,
2013), http://www.wired.com/2013/03/texting-isnt-writing-its-fingered-speech/.
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In terms of style dictating meaning, “fingered speech” is
developing its own form and vocabulary; it does not measure a
decline in written speech but an evolution into a new genre of
communication, according to McWhorter, who gives as example the
changing nuances of the acronym “lol.” With usage, McWhorter sees
those three characters becoming something far subtler than “laughing
out loud” or “loving you lots.” “It’s a marker of empathy,” he advises,
“of accommodation,” what linguists call a “pragmatic particle,” like
the word “yo.”216 Another example is the recently minted acronym
“TLDR” which serves as disclaimer - “too long, didn’t read” or the
use of a forward slash (/) to indicate the author is changing topic. In
some ways, texting resembles Pitman shorthand, an American
transcribing system from the 1950s that few would argue should be
taken for a complete language of communication. It was semaphoric
in style, personal, and economic in its abbreviation of words through
symbols. For legal actors to be tasked with finding criminal intent or
the civil standard of liability in such fragments would be akin to
deciphering a complete unique code or language from linguistic bits
and pieces. In addition, cultural coding must be taken into
consideration that shapes speech to local experiences.
C. Keeping up with Technological Capabilities
By putting our reliance in the court system we expose our private
selves to judiciaries who, often by self-admission, experience
confusion over the complexities of digital communications. Examples
abound: in the 2010 case City of Ontario v. Quon, involving the issue
of constitutional protection of California police communications sent
by a paging system, US Supreme Court Chief Justice John Roberts
asked in oral argument, “What’s the difference between email and a
pager?”217 Justice Anthony Kennedy asked how a text message could
be sent to an officer at the same time he was sending one. Former
Justice Scalia asked, “Could Quon print these spicy little
conversations and send them to his buddies?”218 In one journalist’s
opinion, the implications are profound in that “speech, expression,
and living have become intertwined in technology” so that “[i]f we’re
ever to have a case involving Snapchat selfies and eDiscovery [argued

Id.
City of Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746 (2010).
Kimberly Atkins, Technical difficulties at the Supreme Court, LAWYERS USA (Apr.
19,
2010),
http://lawyersusaonline.com/dcdicta/2010/04/19/technical-difficulties-at-thesupreme-court-2/.
216.
217.
218.
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before the US Supreme Court], we could be in trouble.”219 It provides
small comfort to litigants that US Justice Scalia publicly admitted to
being “Mr. Clueless” when it comes to communications
technology.220 Justice Elena Kagan has acknowledged that the court
hasn’t “gotten to” e-mail yet—reportedly preferring internal
communication by hand-written memos printed on ivory paper.221 As
cyberlaw scholar Michael Geist commented when Internet cases were
beginning to appear on court dockets: “The technology involved in
Internet publication is not a matter of judicial notice of knowledge.
Many of the words used to describe what appears to be happening on
the screen. . . are quite obviously metaphors and the Court cannot
assume that they accurately describe what is actually taking place.”222
Hence they struggle to use technologically neutral language to avoid
dating or over-particularizing their decisions. 223
Technological confusion was also indicated in 2014 when US
Supreme Court Justice Sonia Sotomayor asked a lawyer to compare
the services of his corporate client to “iDrop in the cloud,” a nonexistent data storage system.224 She further asked about the video
streaming service “Netflick” although, despite such gaffes, Justice
Sotomayor is credited for venturing into unfamiliar technological
terrain.225 Also struggling with counsel submissions during the Aereo
argument was Justice Stephen Breyer who said, “I’ve read the briefs

219. See further, Mark Grabowski, Are Technical Difficulties At The Supreme Court
Causing A ‘Disregard Of Duty?’ 3 J. L. TECH. & INTERNET 1, 1 (2011).
220. Jordan Fabian, Chairman to Justices: “Have Either of Y’all Ever Considered
Tweeting or Twitting?” HILLICON VALLEY: THE HILL’S TECH. BLOG (May 21, 2010), http://
thehill.com/policy/technology/99209-chairman-to-justices-have-either-of-yall-ever-consideringtweeting-or-twitting- (quoting Justice Scalia’s testimony at a House judiciary subcommittee
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fairly carefully. . . and I’m still uncertain that I understand it well
enough.”226 His struggles were evident when he suggested that the
tiny broadcast antennas that Aereo sets up in a city could “pick up
every television signal in the world and send it. . . into a person’s
computer.”227
Lawyers also reveal gaps in digital knowledge. For example, in a
2011 class action against Google regarding its Street View geolocation service, the plaintiffs claimed privacy invasion under the
Electronic Communications Privacy Act.228 The information
collected, however, was from open Wi-Fi networks, requiring no
special equipment. It was unencrypted information broadcast into
public airspace.
Similar concerns are expressed within the EU: a report from the
Council of Europe states, that “in most cases, judges and prosecutors
encounter difficulties in coping with the new realities of the cyber
world.”229 As early as 2007 a study of European judges and litigation
lawyers revealed significant discrepancies in their understanding of
the technological basics of electronic evidence. Judges were found to
hold subjective perspectives that created “multiple contradictions”;
they were often divided in their opinions regarding the admissibility
of electronic evidence even when provided with expert testimony.230
Other studies have acknowledged the uneven understanding by
criminal jurists and prosecutors of information and communication
technologies across EU jurisdictions.231
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CONCLUSION
Reputation, privacy and memory comprise a tricolor badge of
personal identity. While all three can be damaged by the untruthful
expressions and data collection practices of others, we can maintain
some command over their function if we are prepared to call on
international legal norms to which western democracies have already
committed in principle. This paper has described that rich inventory
of laws, as well as current local responses within the US and EU that,
to date, have had limited value in lowering our online reputational
risk. The Internet is idiosyncratically over-accommodating in that
regard in its speed, reach, replication, archiving capabilities, and
anonymity – technological features that challenge lawmakers, in
whatever jurisdiction, to acknowledge we are spending increasing
amounts of our daily lives in a shared space much more powerful in
its reputational risk potential than what we used to call mass media.
If we are to rely on extant legal systems, we need a back-tobasics explication of online communications so we can gain a more
informed understanding of the nature of digital speech and structure
gradients of harm for law reform. Much work is needed to understand
the ontological difference of digital speech and evolving forms of
human communication.232 Tapping the wealth of multi-disciplinarity
is key. Superior court judiciaries might want to take leadership in this
by re-examining their oaths of office to ensure they provide wisdom
and guidance to those who struggle to understand law’s relevance to
digital communications. Judges are often tasked with accommodating
new realities while “proclaiming fidelity to the past.”233 Unlike
Internet technology itself, developments in the law must be seen as
continuous, not disruptive.234 Judges, in turn, have been critical of
attorneys’ poor comprehension of digital technologies, in one case
expressing concern that lawyers unquestioningly accept information
from the Internet and often do not know when they should object to
digital evidence.235
EU lawmakers as well need to continue calling to account industry
practices that facilitate personal profiling and extreme speech that can
232. Austin Sarat, Lawrence Douglas & Martha Merrill Umphrey eds, IMAGINING NEW
LEGALITIES: PRIVACY AND ITS POSSIBILITIES IN THE 21ST CENTURY, Introduction, 2 (2012).
233. Id. (suggesting law be an instrument of both continuity and change, all the while
appearing unsettled, not reassured, by such change.)
234. Id.
235. Gary Craig Kessler, Judges’ Awareness, Understanding, and Application of Digital
Evidence, PHD DISSERTATION IN COMPUTING TECHNOLOGY IN EDUCATION, NOVA
SOUTHEASTERN UNIVERSITY (2010), http://www.garykessler.net/library/kessler_judges&de.pdf.
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ruin the social worth and dignity of its citizens.
Extra-legal responses include assuming individual responsibility
for the shape of our personal identities. We can still maintain much
control by exercising prudence in our postings and educating each
other about their indelibility and potential for misguided
manipulation. Microsoft announced it has commissioned research in
Canada, Germany, Ireland, Spain, and the United States that found
that a notable 91 percent of people have made attempts to manage
their online profile at some point but only 44 percent of adults
actively think about the long-term consequences of their online
activities.236 That gap must close if we are to assume reputational
control and use social media responsibly. Curative suggestions
include signing up for personal alerts of others posting our names
online, taking a more aggressive role in shaping our online presence,
using separate accounts for personal and professional profiles and
lobbying the Internet and social media industries to rethink arbitrary
terms of service in favor of user input on the limits of exposure we are
prepared to endure. Within legal systems, lawmakers are encouraged
to think more knowledgably about the changing semantic, social and
cultural contours of language.
As we come to know, click by click, the privacy costs of our
social and digital engagement, and as calls increase for recognition of
Internet access as a human right, we are urged to consider our
important role in untying the Gordian knot.
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